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ENDING THE SUPPRESSION: WHY THE
HATCH ACT CANNOT WITHSTAND
MEANINGFUL CONSTITUTIONAL SCRUTINY
ANTHONY

T.

KOVALCHICK*

On March 30, 1981, President Ronald Reagan was wounded in
an assassination attempt.i Upon hearing this news, a nineteen
year-old clerical worker in the Office of the Constable of Harris
County, Texas, allegedly exclaimed to a co-worker, "If they go for
him again, I hope they get him."2 After a brief conversation with a
superior, she was discharged for making this statement. 3 In Rankin
v. McPherson, the U.S. Supreme Court held that this form of retali
atory termination by the Office of the Constable in response to po
litical speech violated the Free Speech Clause of the First
Amendment, which is applicable to the states by virtue of the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 4 Under these cir
cumstances, the Court determined that a clerical government em
ployee had a First Amendment right to say, inside of the workplace,
that she hoped that a future attempt to assassinate the President of
the United States would be successful.5 Nevertheless, the Court has
also concluded that, outside of the workplace, such a clerical gov
ernment employee has no First Amendment right to campaign for

* Anthony T. KovaIchick received his BS in political science from St. Vincent
College in 1999 and his JD from Duquesne University School of Law in 2002. He is
admitted to practice before the Supreme Court of the United States, the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, and the U.S.
District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania. Since graduating from law
school, he has worked as a contract attorney for Choice Counsel, Inc., and Robert Half
Legal; a law clerk for the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania;
and a volunteer election attorney for Bush/Cheney'04 in Westmoreland County,
Pennsylvania.
1. Robert Pear, Jury Indicts Hinckley on 13 Counts Based on Shooting President,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 1981, at A, available at 1981 WLNR 170353 (Westlaw).
2. Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 380 (1987).
3. Id. at 382.
4. 1d. at 390-92.
5. Id. at 390 (noting that she was fired precisely because of the content of her
speech).
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or against the President, or any other partisan political candidate. 6
Because of fundamentally misguided legislation and an unprinci
pled line of judicial decisions, the federal Hatch Act7 has systemati
cally chilled government employees' participation in partisan
political activity for over seven decades. Despite some important
revisions, several provisions of the Hatch Act are clearly contrary
to basic First Amendment principles. It is incumbent upon legisla
tors, executives, and jurists alike to end this unconstitutional sup
pression of partisan political activity. Those who devote their
careers to public service deserve better than a jurisprudence that
protects their right to participate in the democratic process as re
sponsible citizens outside of the workplace to a lesser degree than it
protects their rights to verbally wish death to the nation's Chief Ex
ecutive inside of the workplace.
The Hatch Act, which was named after Senator Carl Hatch of
New Mexico, was originally enacted in 1939.8 Its purpose was to
prohibit federal executive employees from voluntarily taking an
"active part in political management or in political campaigns."9 In
1940, a similar prohibition was imposed on state and local govern
ment employees whose duties were connected to federally funded
programs and activities. 10 Despite the severity of the restrictions
imposed on the expressive activities of government employees by
the Hatch Act, the Supreme Court upheld the applicable statutory
prohibitions. l l The Court's decisions upholding the Hatch Act
have been totally devoid of constitutional analysis. Notwithstand
ing the First Amendment's mandate that "Congress shall make no
law ... abridging the freedom of speech," the Court has generally
deferred to Congress's judgment concerning the alleged need for
the Hatch Act.1 2 The Court has done so without making a determi
6. 5 U.S.c. § 7322 (2000) (defining "partisan political office" as "any office for
which any candidate is nominated or elected as representing a party any of whose can
didates for Presidential elector received votes in the last preceding election at which
Presidential electors were selected, but shaH exclude any office or position within a
political party or affiliated organization"). See generally U.S. Civil Servo Comm'n V.
Nat'l Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548 (1973); United Pub. Workers V. MitcheH,
330 U.S. 75 (1947).
7. Hatch Act of 1939, Pub. L. No. 76-252, 53 Stat. 1147.
8. Id.; Scott J. Bloch, The Judgment of History: Faction, Political Machines, and
the Hatch Act, 7 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 225, 231 (2005).
9. Bloch, supra note 8, at 230-31.
10. [d. at 233-34; see also Hatch Act of 1940, Pub. L. No. 76-753, 54 Stat. 767
(amending the Hatch Act of 1939).
11. Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548; United Pub. Workers, 330 U.S. 75.
12. Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. at 564.
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nation as to whether restrictions on the voluntary participation of
government employees in partisan political activity are necessary to
secure the interests asserted by Hatch Act supporters. 13 Despite
the clear implication of First Amendment rights by the Hatch Act,
the Court has essentially applied a rational basis test in cases in
volving constitutional challenges to the Act's validity.14 The Su
preme Court's jurisprudence has resulted in a legacy of suppression.
History has proven that the interests asserted by Hatch Act
supporters to justify its prohibitions are not weighty enough to jus
tify coercing the vast majority of government employees into politi
cal silence. In 1974, Congress amended the Hatch Act to permit
covered state and local government employees to participate in par
tisan political activity.1 5 Almost two decades later, in 1993, Con
gress again amended the Hatch Act to permit most federal
executive employees to "take an active part in political manage
ment or in political campaigns."16 Nevertheless, in both instances,
Congress left provisions in place prohibiting covered employees
from becoming candidates in partisan electionsP Consequently,
covered employees risk losing their jobs if they run for partisan po
litical office, even though incumbents in Congress do not have to
resign in order to run for another position. This attempt by incum
bents to insulate themselves from electoral challenges from govern
ment employees has gone virtually unnoticed by many Americans.
Nevertheless, the time has come for the Hatch Act to be exposed
for the incumbent-protectionist sham that it is.
As the Supreme Court has recognized, the government has
broader authority to impose restrictions on the speech of its em
ployees than it does to impose restrictions on the speech of mem
bers of the general public.1 8 This basic principle, however, does not
mean that prohibitions on the partisan political activities of govern
ment employees are constitutionally permissible. Political cam
paign speech lies at the very core of the First Amendment, not at its
13. Rutan v. Republican Party of III., 497 U.S. 62, 98-99 (1990) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
14. United Pub. Workers, 330 U.S. at 101 ("For regulation of employees it is not
necessary that the act regulated be anything more than an act reasonably deemed by
Congress to interfere with the efficiency of the public service. ").
15. Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88
Stat. 1263; Bauers v. Cornett, 865 F.2d 1517, 1523 (8th Cir. 1989).
16. 5 U.S.c. § 7323(a) (2000).
17. Id. §§ 1502(a)(3), 7323(a)(3).
18. Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 671-74 (1994).
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outer edges.19 An individual's right to engage in the expressive ac
tivities associated with a political campaign is highly protected. 20
As the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit recently ex
plained in Republican Party v. White, our constitutional system of
government was "borne of the great struggle to secure such free
doms as political speech" and the protection of such freedoms helps
to "assure the continuance of that constitutional government."21
Even if one accepts the general proposition that the govern
ment may restrain the speech of its employees to a greater degree
than it may restrain the speech of the general public, it does not
follow that the government may constitutionally prohibit its em
ployees from engaging in partisan political activity. While "Con
gress may impose restraints on the job-related speech of public
employees that would be plainly unconstitutional if applied to the
public at large,"22 the Supreme Court has recognized that public
employees do not relinquish all of their First Amendment rights
merely because they enter into an employment relationship with
the government. 23
Although the Supreme Court has upheld the Hatch Act's
prohibitions on the partisan political activities of government em
ployees, it has implicitly acknowledged that such prohibitions do
not serve any weighty governmental interests. 24 Instead of giving
effect to the constitutional mandate of the First Amendment, the
Court has permitted Congress to silence the political speech of gov
ernment employees without subjecting the Hatch Act to any mean
ingful degree of constitutional scrutiny.25 In so doing, the Court has
abdicated its responsibility to give effect to the Constitution. The
Hatch Act violates the First Amendment, demeans the dignity of
the political process, and denigrates the importance of political par
ticipation. It is fundamentally at odds with basic constitutional
principles and it cannot withstand the meaningful constitutional
19. Republican Party v. White, 416 F.3d 738, 749 (8th Cir. 2005).
20. Id.
21. Id. at 748.
22. United States v. Nat'! Treasury Employees Union (NTEU), 513 U.S. 454, 465
(1995).
23. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 418-19 (2006).
24. Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 673 (1994) ("One could make a respectable
argument that political activity by government employees is generally not harmful
.... ").
25. U.S. Civil Servo Comm'n v. Nat'! Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 564
(1973); United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 101 (1947).
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scrutiny that the Supreme Court has inexplicably neglected to apply
in cases that have challenged its validity.
I.

THE SUPREME COURT'S JURISPRUDENCE
CONCERNING THE HATCH

ACT

The First Amendment provides: "Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exer
cise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or
the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the
Government for a redress of grievances."26 Although Congress un
doubtedly has legislative jurisdiction to regulate the terms of fed
eral employment, that authority is subject to the substantive limits
imposed by the First Amendment.
The constitutionality of restrictions on the political activities of
federal employees has been addressed by the U.S. Supreme Court
on several occasions. As early as 1882, in Ex parte Curtis, the Court
upheld a federal statute that made it unlawful for federal executive
officers and employees, other than those appointed by the Presi
dent, "to request [from], give to, or receive from any other officer
or employe of the government any money or property or other
thing of value for political purposes."27 Violators were not only
subject to discharge, but were also guilty of a misdemeanor, punish
able by a five hundred dollar fine. 28 In a brief opinion authored by
Chief Justice Waite, the Court explained that the statutory provi
sion was a valid attempt by Congress "to promote efficiency and
integrity in the discharge of official duties, and to maintain proper
discipline in the public service."29 The Court observed:
If contributions from those in public employment may be solic
ited by others in official authority, it is easy to see that what be
gins as a request may end as a demand, and that a failure to meet
the demand may be treated by those having the power of re
moval as a breach of some supposed duty, growing out of the
political relations of the parties. 3D

Moreover, it was noted that if it was constitutional for Congress to
prohibit the underlying activity, "the kind or degree of punishment
26. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
27. Ex parte Curtis, 106 U.S. 371, 376 (1882) (Bradley, J., dissenting); id. at 375
(majority opinion) (holding the statute constitutional).
28. Id. at 375.
29. Id. at 373.
30. Id. at 374.
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to be inflicted for disregarding the prohibition [was] clearly within
the discretion of Congress, provided [that it was] not cruel or unu
sual."31 Since the Constitution gave Congress the authority to cre
ate the positions held by the employees covered by the statute, the
prohibition was deemed to be a valid exercise of Congress's author
ity under the Necessary and Proper Clause. 32
Justice Bradley authored a dissenting opinion in which he ex
pressed the view that the statutory prohibition violated the First
Amendment. 33 He explained:
To take an interest in public affairs, and to further and promote
those principles which are believed to be vital or important to the
general welfare, is every citizen's duty. It is a just complaint that
so many good men abstain from taking such an interest.
Amongst the necessary and proper means for promoting political
views, or any other views, are association and contribution of
money for that purpose, both to aid discussion and to dissemi
nate information and sound doctrine. To deny to a man the privi
lege of associating and making joint contributions with such
other citizens as he may choose, is an unjust restraint of his right
to propagate and promote his views on public affairs. The free
dom of speech and of the press, and that of assembling together
to consult upon and discuss matters of public interest, and to join
in petitioning for a redress of grievances, are expressly secured
by the Constitution. 34

It is clear from the language of Justice Bradley's dissent that he

viewed the First Amendment as the embodiment of popular.
sovereignty.
The Supreme Court was called upon to decide the constitution
ality of the Hatch Act in United Public Workers v. Mitchell. 35 In
1947, when United Public Workers was decided, the relevant provi
sion was codified at 18 U.S.C. § 61h and provided, in pertinent part:
No officer or employee in the executive branch or the Federal
Government, or any agency or department thereof, except a part
time officer or part-time employee without compensation or with
nominal compensation serving in connection with the existing
war effort, other than in' any capacity relating to the procurement
31.
32.
33.
34.

[d.
Id. at 372.
[d. at 376-79 (Bradley, J., dissenting).
[d. at 376-77.

35.

United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947).
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or manufacture of war material shall take any active part in polit
ical management or in political campaigns. 36
Those who violated the Act were subject to dismissal from their
jobs.37 The Court found the Act to be constitutionally permissi
ble. 38 Speaking through Justice Reed, the Court declared that
"[t]he essential rights of the First Amendment in some instances are
subject to the elemental need for order without which the guaran
tees of civil rights to others would be a mockery."39
The Court's primary basis for upholding the Hatch Act was
Congress's recognition of a "danger to the service in that political
rather than official effort may earn advancement and to the public
in that governmental favor may be channeled through political con
nections. "40 The statutory prohibition was not viewed as a severe
restraint on the First Amendment rights of federal employees be
cause it "[left] untouched full participation by employees in politi
cal decisions at the ballot box and [prohibited] only the partisan
activity of federal personnel deemed offensive to efficiency."41 The
Court explained:
It is only partisan political activity that is interdicted. It is active

participation in political management and political campaigns.
Expressions, public or private, on public affairs, personalities and
matters of public interest, not an objective of party action, are
unrestricted by law so long as the government employee does not
direct his activities toward party success. 42
The Act's indiscriminate application to employees in various job
categories was of no concern to the Court. Noting that "Congress
may have thought that government employees are handy elements
for leaders in political policy to use in building a political machine,"
the Court declared that "[f]or regulation of employees it is not nec
essary that the act regulated be anything more than an act reasona
bly deemed by Congress to interfere with the efficiency of the
public service."43 Rejecting the idea that the political activities of
industrial workers could not be limited even if the political activities
of administrative workers could be limited, the Court explained
36.
37.
38.

39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

at
at
at
at
at
[d. at
[d. at
[d. at
[d.
[d.
[d.
/d.
/d.

78 0.2.
79.

103.
95.
98.
99.

100.
101.
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that" '[ t ]he determination of the extent to which political activities
of governmental employees shall be regulated lies primarily with
Congress.'''44 Although it may not have been apparent at the time,
the Court applied a standard that was no more rigorous than a "ra
tional basis" review.
Justice Black dissented on the ground that the Hatch Act vio
lated the First Amendment. 45 He explained that "[p]opular govern
ment, to be effective, must permit and encourage much wider
political activity by all the people."46 He declared:
Our political system, different from many others, rests on
the foundation of a belief in rule by the people-not some, but
all the people. Education has been fostered better to fit people
for self-expression and good citizenship. In a country whose peo
ple elect their leaders and decide great public issues, the voice of
none should be suppressed-at least such is the assumption of
the First Amendment. That Amendment, unless I misunderstand
its meaning, includes a command that the Government must, in
order to promote its own interest, leave the people at liberty to
speak their own thoughts about government, advocate their own
favored governmental causes, and work for their own political
candidates and parties. 47

In the opinion of Justice Black, the First Amendment did not allow
Congress to "make[] honest participation in essential political ac
tivities an offense punishable by proscription from public
employment. "48
Justice Douglas also filed a dissenting opinion. He expressed
the view that if the First Amendment rights of federal employees
needed to be curtailed for the sake of "the larger requirements of
modern democratic government," the restrictions imposed by Con
gress needed to be "narrowly and selectively drawn to define and
punish the specific conduct which constitut[ed] a clear and present
danger to the operations of government."49 According to Justice
Douglas, the Hatch Act's sweeping prohibitions could not be con
stitutionally applied to industrial workers. 50 He expressed no opin
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at
at
at

102.
109 (Black, J., dissenting).
110.
114.
115.
126 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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ion as to whether prohibitions of this kind could be constitutionally
applied to employees in other job categories. 51
Subsequent to United Public Workers, the Supreme Court be
gan to delineate the First Amendment rights of public employees
with respect to the terms and conditions of their employment. In
Pickering v. Board of Education, the Court explained that "[t]he
theory that public employment which may be denied altogether
may be subjected to any conditions, regardless of how unreasona
ble, has been uniformly rejected."52 In Pickering, a high school
teacher was dismissed for writing a letter to a newspaper that criti
cized how the Board of Education had allocated financial resources
between certain academic and athletic programs. 53 The Court con
cluded that the teacher's dismissal violated the First and Fourteenth
Amendments. It was acknowledged that "the State has interests as
an employer in regulating the speech of its employees that differ
significantly from those it possesses in connection with regulation of
the speech of the citizenry in general. "54 The Court declared that
"[t]he problem in any case is to arrive at a balance between the
interests of the teacher, as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of
public concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in pro
moting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its
employees."55 This balancing is frequently referred to as the Pick
ering balancing test.
Applying this balancing test, the Court explained that since
teachers were "the members of a community most likely to have
informed and definite opinions as to how funds allotted to the oper
ation of the schools should be spent," it was "essential that they be
able to speak out freely on such questions without fear of retalia
tory dismissal. "56 Although some of the specific financial figures
included in the teacher's letter were inaccurate, the Court reasoned
that the school board could have easily rebutted the teacher's errors
by publishing the actual financial figures in a letter to the same
newspaperY The precise statements involved, though critical of
the teacher's employer, were not shown to have impeded the
51. Id. at 126 n.14.
52. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968) (quoting Keyishian v. Bd.
of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 605-06 (1967».
53. Id. at 566.
54. Id. at 568.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 572.
57. Id.
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teacher's proper performance of his duties or to have interfered
with the general operation of the schools within the districp8 Since
the fact of the teacher's employment was only "tangentially and in
substantially involved in the subject matter of the public communi
cation" contained in the letter, the Court concluded that it was
"necessary to regard the teacher as the member of the general pub
lic. "59 The Court determined that, absent proof that the teacher's
statements were made with knowledge that they were false or with
reckless disregard as to whether they were false, they could not con
stitutionally furnish the basis for his dismissa1. 60 Commenting on
the importance of the First Amendment issues at stake in the case,
the Court declared that "[w]hile criminal sanctions and damage
awards have a somewhat different impact on the exercise of the
right to freedom of speech [than] dismissal from employment," the
threat of dismissal was nevertheless "a potent means of inhibiting
speech."61
In 1973, five years after Pickering, the Supreme Court revisited
the issue of the Hatch Act's constitutionality. The applicable provi
sion of the Hatch Act was 5 U.S.C. § 7324(a)(2), which prohibited
federal executive employees and employees of the government of
the District of Columbia from taking "an active part in political
management or in political campaigns. "62 In United States Civil
Service Commission v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, the Court
"unhesitatingly" reaffirmed its prior decision in United Public
Workers.63 In the Court's view, "neither the First Amendment nor
any other provision of the Constitution" invalidated a statute bar
ring federal employees from engaging in partisan political activity.64
In so holding, the Court referred to "the judgment of history" that
it was in the best interest of the country "that federal service should
depend upon meritorious performance rather than political service,
and that the political influence of federal employees on others and
on the electoral process should be limited."65
The opinion of the Court in Letter Carriers was delivered by
Justice White, who explained that it was the judgment of Congress
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
(1973).
63.
64.
65.

Id. at 572-73.
Id. at 574.
Id.
/d.
U.S. Civil Servo Comm'n
/d. at 556.
Id.
Id. at 557.

V.

Nat') Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 550
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that partisan political activities of federal employees needed to be
limited if "the Government [was] to operate effectively and fairly,
elections [were] to play their proper part in representative govern
ment, and employees themselves [were] to be sufficiently free from
improper influences. "66 He noted that the Hatch Act's prohibitions
did not target particular parties or viewpoints, and that they sought
to control neither the political opinions of federal employees nor
the votes cast by those employees. 67 Relying on the Court's prior
decision in Pickering, Justice White declared:
"The problem in any case is to arrive at a balance between the
interests of the [employee], as a citizen, in commenting upon
matters of public concern and the interest of the [government], as
an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it
performs through its employees." Although Congress is free to
strike a different balance than it has, if it so chooses, we think the
balance it has so far struck is sustainable by the obviously impor
tant interests sought to be served by the limitations on partisan
political activities now contained in the Hatch Act. 68

The Court identified four governmental interests to justify uphold
ing the Hatch Act. The first was a generalized interest in ensuring
that federal employees administer the law "in accordance with the
will of Congress" rather than in accordance with the "will of a par
ticular political party."69 The Court thought that forbidding parti
san political activities on the part of federal employees would
"reduce the hazards to fair and effective government."70 Second,
the Court believed that it was not only important that federal em
ployees avoid "practicing political justice," but that "they appear to
the public to be avoiding it."71 In the Court's view, the Hatch Act
prevented confidence in the system of representative government
from being "eroded to a disastrous extent."72 Third, the Court
noted that Congress had an interest in preventing a political party
from "using the thousands or hundreds of thousands of federal em
ployees, paid for at public expense, to man its political structure
and political campaigns. "73 Fourth, the Court highlighted the gov
66.
67.
68.
original).
69.

70.
71.

72.
73.

Id. at 564.
Id.
Id. (quoting Pickering v. Bd. of Educ. 391 U.S. 562, 568 (1968» (alteration in
Id. at 564-65.
Id. at 565.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 565-66.
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ernment's interest in ensuring that federal employees did not feel
pressured or coerced "to vote in a certain way or perform political
chores in order to curry favor with their superiors rather than to act
out their own beliefs."74 The Court deferred to the legislative de
termination that prohibiting federal employees from engaging in
partisan political activity provided the "most significant safeguard
against coercion."75 The Court concluded that "[n]either the right
to associate nor the right to participate in political activities is abso
lute in any event."76
In a dissenting opinion joined by Justices Brennan and Mar
shall, Justice Douglas decried the Court's conclusory decision to re
affirm its prior decision in United Public Workers.77 He insisted
that if the case had involved "social or economic matters," it would
have been sufficient for the Court to apply the rational basis stan
dard that had been the touchstone of the United Public Workers
precedent. 78 Relying on Pickering, Justice Douglas explained that
United Public Workers had been "of a different vintage" from Let
ter Carriers.7 9 He declared that laws trenching on the freedom to
discuss governmental affairs needed to be "narrowly and precisely
drawn to deal with precise ends."80 Conceding that the government
could constitutionally prevent its employees from engaging in parti
san political activity on office time, Justice Douglas insisted that "it
[was] of no concern of the government what [the] employee said in
private to his wife or to the public in Constitution Hall. "81
Even a cursory reading of the Supreme Court's opinion in Let
ter Carriers reveals its unprincipled nature. As the Court would
later observe in United States v. National Treasury Employees
Union, the balancing test that had been applied in Pickering was
never truly applied in Letter Carriers .82 Instead, the Court simply
"restated in balancing terms" its prior approval of the Hatch Act in
United Public Workers.83 In other words, instead of applying Pick
ering in order to determine whether the Hatch Act was constitu
74.
75.
76.
77.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
/d.

at
at
at
at

566.
566-67.
567.
596-97 (Douglas, J., dissenting).

78.
79.
at 598.
80.
8l.
at 597.
82. United States v. Nat'l Treasury Employees Union (NTEU), 513 U.S. 454, 467
(1995).
83.

Id.
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tional, the Court simply cited Pickering as a basis for adhering to its
prior decision in United PubLic Workers. United PubLic Workers
was decided in accordance with a rational basis analysis. 84 Such a
deferential standard was a far cry from the balancing test that
would later be applied in Pickering.
With respect to the first three interests identified by the Court
to justify its decision to uphold the Hatch Act in Letter Carriers, it is
clear that the Court blurred the distinction between a federal em
ployee's job performance and his or her individual speech as a citi
zen. In Pickering, the Court found it necessary to regard the
teacher "as the member of the general public" when he spoke out
against the actions of his employer.85 In Letter Carriers, the Court
ignored the distinction between an employee's job duties and his or
her independent speech. Instead of recognizing this distinction and
applying the Pickering balancing test, the Letter Carriers majority
simply assumed that federal employees would be unable to perform
their duties at work in a nonpartisan manner if they were engaging
in partisan political activities away from the workplace. 86
Under the Supreme Court's recent decision in Garcetti v.
CebaLLos, the First Amendment does not protect a public employee
from employer discipline for speech made pursuant to that em
ployee's official duties. 87 This is a sensible rule since an employee
who speaks pursuant to his or her official duties does not speak on
his or her own behalf as a citizen. Nevertheless, the converse of this
rule was ignored in Letter Carriers. The Letter Carriers majority
spoke as if all partisan political activity on the part of a federal em
ployee was undertaken pursuant to the employee's official duties
rather than in his or her capacity as a private citizen.88 Where a
public employee engages in independent speech as a citizen, an in
quiry must be conducted as to whether this speech is about a matter
of public concern. 89 If the employee's speech does not involve a
matter of public concern, the public employer's reaction to that
speech does not violate the First Amendment. 90 However, if the
84. After all, it was in United Public Workers that the Court declared that "[fjor
regulation of employees it is not necessary that the act regulated be anything more than
an act reasonably deemed by Congress to interfere with the efficiency of the public
service." United Pub. Workers v. MitChell, 330 U.S. 75, 101 (1947).
85. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 574 (1968).
86. Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. at 564-65.
87. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 426 (2006).
88. Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. at 564-65.
89. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 418 (citing Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568).
90. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147 (1983).
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employee's speech does involve a matter of public concern, "the
possibility of a First Amendment claim arises."91 At that point,
"The question becomes whether the relevant government entity
had an adequate justification for treating the employee differently
from any other member of the general public."92 As the Supreme
Court noted in Garcetti, "So long as employees are speaking as citi
zens about matters of public concern, they must face only those
speech restrictions that are necessary for their employers to operate
efficiently and effectively."93
The Supreme Court's language in Garcetti defines the constitu
tionallimit on the government's ability to suppress the speech of its
employees. This standard does not allow a public employer to have
the final say as to whether a given restriction on speech is neces
sary. In Letter Carriers, however, the Court simply deferred to
Congress's judgment as to the necessity of the Hatch Act. 94 The
rationale that was applied in Letter Carriers acted as a rubber stamp
for a political judgment that had already been made. 95 For this rea
son, Letter Carriers is at odds with the Court's subsequent decisions
concerning the First Amendment rights of public employees.
The fourth interest identified by the Court in Letter Carriers as
a basis for upholding the Hatch Act was the government's interest
in protecting its employees from political coercion. 96 By relying on
this interest, however, the Court ignored the fact that the Hatch
Act was itself coercive. Federal employees were compelled to re
frain from political activity. Suppressing the political speech of fed
eral employees for the sake of protecting the First Amendment
rights of those employees is like banning women from the work
place in order to prevent sexual harassment. The object of the pro
hibition is subsumed by the prohibition itself. In Wooley v.
Maynard, the Court declared that "the right of freedom of thought
protected by the First Amendment against state action includes
both the right to speak freely and the right to refrain from speaking
at a11."97 The First Amendment protects an affirmative right to
91. Garcetti, 547 u.s. at 418.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 419.
94. U.S. Civil Servo Comm'n v. Nat'l Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 564
(1973).
95. Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 497 U.S. 62, 98-99 (1990) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
96. Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. at 566-67.
97. Wooley V. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977).
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speak to the same extent that it protects a right to refrain from
speaking.
In Board of Directors of Rotary International v. Rotary Club of
Duarte, the Supreme Court explained that "the right to engage in
activities protected by the First Amendment implies 'a correspond
ing right to associate with others in pursuit of a wide variety of po
litical, social, economic, educational, religious, and cultural
ends.' "98 This right of expressive association "has its fullest and
most urgent application precisely to the conduct of campaigns for
political office."99 As the Court stated in Buckley v. Valeo, "In a
republic where the people are sovereign, the ability of the citizenry
to make informed choices among candidates for office is essential,
for the identities of those who are elected will inevitably shape the
course that we follow as a nation."100 Moreover, a citizen's speech
for or against the election of a political candidate is obviously
speech regarding a matter of public concern. Consequently, within
the context of the Pickering balancing test, it would take a very
weighty governmental interest to outweigh a public employee's in
terest in participating in a political campaign.
Had the Court actually applied the Pickering test in Letter Car
riers, it is highly unlikely that the Hatch Act could have been up
held on the basis of a generalized interest in "efficiency." For this
reason, the Court observed, in hindsight, that the "employee-pro
tective rationale" discussed in Letter Carriers provided a much
stronger justification for upholding the Hatch Act's prohibition on
partisan political activity than did the government's interest in
"workplace efficiency. "101 This rationale, however, accounts only
for the "protection" of those federal employees who would feel co
erced or pressured to participate in partisan political campaigns. It
ignores the First Amendment rights of those employees who would
choose to participate in partisan political activity rather than be co
erced into political silence by the Hatch Act. This reality highlights
the fundamental flaw in the Court's reasoning in United Public
Workers and Letter Carriers.
In the aftermath of Letter Carriers, the Supreme Court has
consistently held that the First Amendment protects government
98. Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int'I v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 548 (1987)
(quoting Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622 (1984».
99. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 15 (1976).
100. Id. at 14-15.
101. United States v. Nat'l Treasury Employees Union (NTEU), 513 U.S. 454,
475-76 n.21 (1995).
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employees from job-related discrimination on the basis of political
affiliation. In Elrod v. Burns, the Court held that the First Amend
ment prohibited public employers from dismissing nonpolicymak
ing employees because of their political affiliation.lo2 The basis for
this holding was the severe restrictions on political belief and asso
ciation that resulted from patronage dismissals. 103 This rule was re
fined in Branti v. Finkel, in which the Court explained that a public
employer could constitutionally dismiss an employee because of his
or her political affiliation only upon a showing that party affiliation
was "an appropriate requirement for the effective performance of
the public office involved. "104 In Rutan v. Republican Party of Illi
nois, the Court extended Elrod and Branti by holding that "promo
tion, transfer, recall, and hiring decisions involving low-level
government employees may [not] constitutionally be based on party
affiliation."lo5 Constitutional protection was later extended to in
dependent contractors in Board of County Commissioners v.
Umbehr 106 and O'Hare Truck Service, Inc. v. City of Northlake.107
In Umbehr, the Court determined that the First Amendment pro
tected independent contractors from government entities' retalia
tory termination of their contracts because of the contractors'
speech, and that the extent of this protection was to be determined
in accordance with the Pickering balancing test. 108 In O'Hare, the
Court concluded that it was unconstitutional for a governmental en
tity to cancel the contract of an independent contractor, or to re
move that contractor from an official list of contractors authorized
to perform public services, because of his or her political
allegiance. 109
The underlying purpose behind the Supreme Court's decisions
in Elrod, Branti, Rutan, Umbehr, and O'Hare was the protection of
political freedom. As the Court explained in Rutan, "The First
Amendment prevents the government, except in the most compel
ling circumstances, from wielding its power to interfere with its em
ployees' freedom to believe and associate, or to not believe and not
associate."110 United Public Workers and Letter Carriers are clearly
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 372-73 (1976) (plurality opinion).
Id.
Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 518 (1980).
Rutan v. Republican Party of IlL, 497 U.S. 62, 65 (1990).
Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668 (1996).
O'Hare Truck Serv., Inc. v. City of Northlake, 518 U.S. 712 (1996).
Umbehr, 518 U.S. at 673.
O'Hare, 518 U.S. at 714-15.
Rutan, 497 U.S. at 76.
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at odds with this fundamental principle. Participation in a political
campaign is the quintessential example of the exercise of the "free
dom to believe and associate" described in Rutan. ll1 The Hatch
Act's prohibition on partisan political activity, particularly when
viewed in the context of the Court's rationale for striking down em
ployment-related patronage policies, is incompatible with the Free
Speech Clause.
There is, of course, a distinction between the Hatch Act upheld
in United Public Workers and Letter Carriers and the patronage
practices found to be unconstitutional in Elrod, Branti, Rutan,
Umbehr, and O'Hare. The Hatch Act's prohibitions were view
point neutral, while the patronage practices were viewpoint based.
The Hatch Act prohibited federal employees from taking "an active
part in political management or political campaigns" for the benefit
of any political party, while the patronage practices rewarded or
punished employees or contractors for supporting or opposing the
candidates of a particular party.112 In certain instances, the govern
ment can impose content-based restrictions on speech that would
be constitutionally impermissible if they restricted speech on the
basis of viewpoint. As the Court noted in Davenport v. Washington
Education Ass'n, "when the government permits speech on govern
ment property that is a nonpublic forum, it can exclude speakers on
the basis of their subject matter, so long as the distinctions drawn
are viewpoint neutral and reasonable in light of the purpose served
by the forum."113 The most rigorous form of First Amendment
scrutiny is applicable when public officials attempt to suppress ex
pression merely because they disagree with the speaker's views.l 14
In any event, the tension between the decisions upholding the
Hatch Act and the decisions invalidating patronage policies is not
eliminated merely because the Hatch Act was only content-based
while the patronage policies were viewpoint based. The Court in
validated the patronage policies for the purpose of safeguarding the
political freedom of public employees and contractors.l 15 Never
theless, a First Amendment right to be free from viewpoint-based
retaliation for engaging in political activity is of little constitutional
value if the government can prohibit that same activity by enacting
a content-based prohibition like the Hatch Act. Content-based
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

Id.

5 U.S.C. § 7323 (2000).
Davenport v. Wash. Educ. Ass'n, 127 S. Ct. 2372, 2381 (2007).
Ark. Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 677-78 (1998).
O'Hare Truck Serv., Inc. v. City of Northlake, 518 U.S. 712, 725-26 (1996).
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prohibitions on collective political expression prohibit the same ac
tivities that are chilled by unconstitutional patronage practices. To
the extent that the Hatch Act was designed to protect the First
Amendment rights of federal employees, it was inherently self-de
feating. The Free Speech Clause protects both the "freedom to be
lieve and associate" and the freedom "to not believe and not
associate."116 Prohibitions on political activity sacrifice the former
for the sake of the latter. Moreover, when political activity is pro
hibited, employees are not freely exercising their right to refrain
from political activity. Instead, they are coerced into refraining
from political activity. Given this reality, the underlying rationale
for the Court's decisions in United Public Workers and Letter Carri
ers was nonsensical.
In Branti, the Supreme Court explained that the government
demonstrates a compelling interest in making personnel decisions
on the basis of political affiliation only when it can show that "party
affiliation is an appropriate requirement for the effective perform
ance of the public office involved."117 The line between positions
for which party affiliation is an appropriate requirement and posi
tions for which it is not can be difficult to draw. This difficulty,
however, is not obviated by content-based prohibitions on public
employees' participation in partisan political activity. When politi
cal affiliation is an appropriate requirement for a given position, the
government is free to engage in viewpoint-based discrimination
when it fills that position.11 8 This is true even if the employee who
accepts the position is thereafter prohibited from engaging in politi
cal activity.1 19 For this reason, the fact that the First Amendment
permits the government to make viewpoint-based personnel deci
sions in limited circumstances provides no constitutional justifica
tion for content-based prohibitions like the Hatch Act.
The Hatch Act cannot be justified on the basis of Congress's
clear legislative jurisdiction to regulate the terms of federal employ
ment. Although the Constitution undoubtedly bestows on Con
gress the authority to set the terms and conditions of federal
employment,12o the First Amendment imposes a substantive limit

116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

Rutan v. Republican Party of IIl., 497 U.S. 62, 76 (1990).
Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 518 (1980).
See id.
[d.
U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, d. 3.
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on that authority.121 If legislation could be sustained in the face of
a First Amendment challenge solely on the basis of Congress's leg
islative jurisdiction, the First Amendment would itself be wholly su
perfluous. If Congress has no express or implied constitutional
authority to enact a law in the first place, the law is unconstitutional
regardless of whether it abridges the freedom of speech.122 Even
when Congress acts within its constitutional sphere of authority,
legislation that does not comport with the First Amendment is
void. 123
In certain instances, the Supreme Court has recognized that
particular Article I powers are inherently suited to accommodate
First Amendment concerns. For example, the Copyright and Patent
Clause gives Congress the power "[t]o promote the Progress of Sci
ence and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Dis
coveries."124 In Eldred v. Ashcroft, the Court explained that the
"limited monopolies" created by copyright law are "compatible
with free speech principles."125 "By establishing a marketable right
to the use of one's expression, copyright [law] supplies the eco
nomic incentive to create and disseminate ideas."126 As the Court
noted in Eldred, copyright law "distinguishes between ideas and ex
pression and makes only the latter eligible for copyright protec
tion."127 When a constitutional or statutory provision is precisely
tailored to accommodate First Amendment concerns, the need for
strict judicial scrutiny is less apparent.1 28 In contrast, when statu
tory provisions specifically target expressive activities for suppres
sion, the need for exacting judicial scrutiny is more obvious. The
collective action that occurs when citizens band together to elect a
political candidate is, of course, at the very heart of the First

121. United States v. Nat'l Treasury Employees Union (NTEU), 513 U.S. 454,
465-68 (1995).
122. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
123. Ashcroft v. Free Speech CoaL, 535 U.S. 234, 253-55 (2002).
124. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
125. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003).
126. Id. (quoting Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539
(1985)).
127. Id.; see 17 U.S.c. § 102(b) (2000).
128. See S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 535
(1987).
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Amendment.1 29 It is clear that the Hatch Act contains no "built-in
First Amendment accommodations. "130
In addition to statutes that contain built-in accommodations
for First Amendment freedoms, there are statutory provisions that
burden or prohibit only those forms of speech that are categorically
unprotected by the Free Speech Clause. A classic example of this
type of legislation is the Trademark Act of 1946, which is commonly
referred to as the Lanham Act. l3l The Lanham Act contains both
provisions prohibiting trademark infringement and provisions
prohibiting false or misleading advertising. 132 The Lanham Act's
trademark infringement provisions prohibit the commercial use of
registered marks when "such use is likely to cause confusion, or to
cause mistake, or to deceive."133 The statute's unfair competition
provisions prohibit the commercial use of "false designation[s] of
origin, false or misleading description [s] of fact, or false or mislead
ing representation[s] of fact. "134 Civil liability is imposed on those
who violate the Lanham Act.1 35 This statute, however, does not
raise First Amendment concerns because it deals with false or mis
leading commercial speech, which is categorically unprotected by
the First Amendment.1 36 For this reason, Congress can use its au
thority under the Commerce Clause to enact legislation such as the
Lanham Act. Unlike false or misleading commercial speech, politi
cal campaign speech is highly protected.1 37 Consequently, statutory
prohibitions on partisan political activity do not fall within the con
stitutional authority of Congress even when Congress acts pursuant
to an express or implied constitutional power.

129. See N.Y. State Club Ass'n, Inc. v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1, 13 (1988).
130. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 219 (noting that since copyright law contains built-in
First Amendment protections, the Copyright Term Extension Act did not violate the
First Amendment).
131. ColI. Say. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S.
666, 669 (1999).
132. 15 U.S.c. §§ 1114, 1125 (2000).
133. Id. § 1114(1)(a)-(b).
134. Id. § 1125(a).
135. !d. §§ 1114, 1125.
136. Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass'n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 183
(1999) (citing Cent. Hudson Gas & EJec. Corp. v. Pub. Servo Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S.
557 (1980».
137. Republican Party V. White, 416 F.3d 738, 748-49 (8th Cir. 2005).
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THE HATCH ACT'S CURRENT ApPLICATION
TO FEDERAL EXECUTIVE EMPLOYEES

In 1993, Congress amended the Hatch Act to permit most ex
ecutive branch employees to participate in partisan political activ
ity.B s The amended statute declares it to be "the policy of the
Congress that employees should be encouraged to exercise fully,
freely, and without fear of penalty or reprisal, and to the extent not
expressly prohibited by law, their right to participate or to refrain
from participating in the political processes of the Nation."139 For
purposes of the Act, the term "employee" includes:
any individual, other than the President and the Vice President,
employed or holding office in ... an Executive agency other than
the Government Accountability Office ... a position within the
competitive service which is not an Executive agency, ... or ...
the government of the District of Columbia, other than the
Mayor or a member of the City Councilor the Recorder of
Deeds; but does not include a member of the uniformed
services. 140

The Act's substantive provisions are codified at 5 U.S.c.
§§ 7323 and 7324. Section 7323(a)(1) prohibits an employee from
"us[ing] his [or her] official authority or influence for the purpose
of interfering with or affecting the result of an election."141 Section
7323(a)(2) limits the category of persons from whom an employee
may "solicit, accept or receive a political contribution."142 Most no
tably, § 7323(a)(2)(B) prohibits employees from seeking political
contributions from their subordinates. 143 Under § 7323(a)(3), an
employee may not "run for the nomination or as a candidate for
election to a partisan political office."144 The term "partisan politi
cal office" is defined as "any office for which any candidate is nomi
nated or elected as representing a party any of whose candidates for
Presidential elector received votes in the last preceding election at
which Presidential electors were selected, [excluding] any office or
position within a political party or affiliated organization. "145 Sec
tion 7323(a)(4) provides that an employe~ may not "knowingly so
138. Hatch Act Reform Amendments of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-94, 107 Stat. 1001.
139. 5 U.S.c. § 7321 (2000).
140. Id. § 7322(1)(A)-(C).
141. Id. § 7323(a)(I).
142. [d. § 7323(a)(2).
143. Id. § 7323(a)(2)(B).
144. Id. § 7323(a)(3).
145. Id. § 7322(2).
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licit or discourage the participation in any political activity of any
person who . . . has an application for any compensation, grant,
contract, ruling, license, permit, or certificate pending before the
employing office of such employee," or who "is the subject of or a
participant in an ongoing audit, investigation, or enforcement ac
tion being carried out by the employing office of such em
ployee."146 Section 7324(a) generally prohibits employees, who are
on duty, from engaging in political activity while
in any room or building occupied in the discharge of official du
ties by an individual employed or holding office in the Govern
ment of the United States or any agency or instrumentality
thereof, ... while wearing a uniform or official insignia identify
ing the office or position of the employee, ... or while using any
vehicle owned or leased by the Government of the United States
or any agency or instrumentality thereof. 147

Some employees are subject to more restrictive provisions.
Section 7323(b)(1) provides that "[a]n employee of the Federal
Election Commission (except one appointed by the President, by
and with the advice and consent of the Senate), may not request or
receive from, or give to, an employee, a Member of Congress, or an
officer of a uniformed service a political contribution."148 Employ
ees of agencies and offices enumerated in § 7323(b )(2)(B), except
those employees "appointed by the President, by and with the ad
vice and consent of the Senate," are prohibited from taking an "ac
tive part in political management or political campaigns."149 The
agencies and offices covered under this prohibition include the Fed
eral Election Commission or Election Assistance Commission; Fed
eral Bureau of Investigation; Secret Service; Central Intelligence
Agency; National Security Council; National Security Agency; De
fense Intelligence Agency; Merit Systems Protection Board; Office
of Special Counsel; Office of Criminal Investigation of the Internal
Revenue Service; Office of Investigative Programs of the U.S. Cus
toms Service; Office of Law Enforcement of the Bureau of Alcohol,
146. Id. § 7323(a)(4)(A)-(B).
147. Id. § 7324(a)(1)-(4). These prohibitions are qualified by § 7324(b).
148. Id. § 7323(b)(1).
149. Id. § 7323(b)(2)(A). Section 7323(b)(4) provides:
For purposes of this subsection, the term "active part in political management
or in a political campaign" means those acts of political management or politi
cal campaigning which were prohibited for employees of the competitive ser
vice before July 19, 1940, by determinations of the Civil Service Commission
under the rules prescribed by the President.
[d.
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Tobacco, and Firearms; National Imagery and Mapping Agency
(National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency); and Office of the Direc
tor of National Intelligence. 15o The prohibition also applies to ad
ministrative law judges and administrative appeals judges who are
employed in positions described in 5 V.S.c. §§ 5372, 5372a, and
5372b, as well as "career appointees"151 described in 5 V.S.c.
§ 3132(a)(4).152 Section 7323(b)(3) provides that "[n]o employee of
the Criminal Division or National Security Division of the Depart
ment of Justice (except one appointed by the President, by and with
the advice and consent of the Senate), may take an active part in
political management or political campaigns."153 The Act makes it
clear, however, that "[a]n employee retains the right to vote as he
[or she] chooses and to express his [or her] opinion on political sub
jects and candidates."154
The penalties for violating the Act are described in § 7326,
which provides:
An employee or individual who violates section 7323 or 7324 of
this title [5 U.S.C.] shall be removed from his position, and funds
appropriated for the position from which removed thereafter
may not be used to pay the employee or individual. However, if
the Merit System Protection Board finds by unanimous vote that
the violation does not warrant removal, a penalty of not less than
30 days' suspension without pay shall be imposed by direction of
the Board. I55

Given the language of the statute, covered employees who engage
in prohibited political activities risk losing their jobs.
In many ways, the importance of the alleged interests relied
upon by the Supreme Court to uphold the Hatch Act in United
Public Workers and Letter Carriers is belied by Congress's subse
quent decision to permit most federal employees to actively partici
pate in partisan political activities. Although § 7323(b) still
prohibits some employees from taking "an active part in political
management or political campaigns," the overwhelming majority of
150. Id. § 7323(b)(2)(B)(i).
151. Id. § 3132(a)(4) (defining a "career appointee" as "an individual in a Senior
Executive Service position whose appointment to the position or previous appointment
to another Senior Executive Service position was based on approval by the Office of
Personnel Management of the executive qualifications of such individual").
152. /d. § 7323(b)(2)(B)(ii).
153. Id. § 7323(b)(3).
154. Id. § 7323(c).
155. Id. § 7326.
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federal employees are now free to engage in political activities away
from the workplace. 156 The fact that § 7323(a) has permitted active
political participation by most federal employees since 1993 without
wreaking the havoc predicted by Hatch Act supporters serves to
illustrate the speculative exaggerations behind the rationale
adopted by the Court in United Public Workers and Letter Carriers.
Shortly after Congress relaxed the Hatch Act's restrictions on
most federal employees, the Supreme Court commented on the
government's authority to restrain the speech of its employees in
Waters v. Churchill.1 57 In a plurality opinion joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist, Justice Souter, and Justice Ginsburg, Justice O'Connor
declared that "[t]he government's interest in achieving its goals as
effectively and efficiently as possible is elevated from a relatively
subordinate interest when it acts as sovereign to a significant one
when it acts as employer."158 In dictum, Justice O'Connor ex
plained that while "[o]ne could make a respectable argument that
political activity by government employees is generally not harm
ful," the Court had "given substantial weight to government em
ployers' reasonable predictions of disruption."159 The problem with
this reasoning is that it ignores the nature of the constitutional in
quiry. The constitutionality of a prohibition on political activity de
pends precisely on whether it is necessary.160 If that were not the
case, there would be no meaning to the Court's admonition in
Garcetti that "[s]o long as employees are speaking as citizens about
matters of public concern, they must face only those speech restric
tions that are necessary for their employer to operate efficiently and
effectively."161 As Justice Scalia noted in his Rutan dissent, the
Court did not conclude that the Hatch Act was necessary in United
Public Workers or Letter Carriers .1 62 Instead, the Court simply de
ferred to Congress's judgment without subjecting the Hatch Act to
any measure of meaningful judicial scrutiny.1 63
A little over a year after the 1993 amendments to the Hatch
Act, the Supreme Court decided United States v. National Treasury
156. 5 V.S.c. § 7323(a).
157. Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661 (1994).
158. Id. at 675.
159. Id. at 673.
160. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 418 (2006) (stating that "[w]hen a citizen
enters government service, the citizen by necessity must accept certain limitations on his
or her freedom." (emphasis added)).
161. Id. (emphasis added).
162. Rutan v. Republican Party of III., 497 U.S. 62, 98-99 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
163. /d.
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Employees Union (NTEU).164 In NTEU, the Court addressed the
constitutionality of 5 U.S.c. § 50l(b), the Ethics in Government
Act, "which broadly prohibited federal employees from accepting
compensation for making speeches or writing articles. "165 Speaking
through Justice Stevens, the Court explained that the federal em
ployees who challenged § 501(b) sought "compensation for their
expressive activities in their capacity as citizens, not as government
employees."166 "Unlike Pickering and its progeny," Justice Stevens
noted, NTEU "did not involve a post hoc analysis of one em
ployee's speech and its impact on that employee's public responsi
bilities."167 Instead, the government asked the Court "to apply
Pickering to Congress' wholesale deterrent to a broad category of
expression by a massive number of potential speakers."168
The Court stated that while it "normally accord[ ed] a stronger
presumption of validity to a congressional judgment than to an indi
vidual executive's disciplinary action," the far-reaching impact of
§ 50l(b)'s honoraria ban "gave rise to far more serious concerns
than could any single supervisory decision."169 Moreover, it was
noted that "unlike an adverse action taken in response to actual
speech," § 50l(b) chilled speech before it happened. 170 The Court
went on to state:
[T]he Government's burden is greater with respect to this statu
tory restriction on expression than with respect to an isolated dis
ciplinary decision. The Government must show that the interests
of both potential audiences and a vast group of present and fu
ture employees in a broad range of present and future expression
are outweighed by the expression's "necessary impact on the ac
tual operation" of the Government. l71

Even though § 501(b) neither prohibited speech nor discriminated
among speakers "based on the content or viewpoint of their
messages," the Court recognized that § 501(b) "unquestionably im
pose[d] a significant burden on expressive activity" by denying fed
eral employees a significant incentive to engage in such activity.In
164. United States v. Nat'l Treasury Employees Union (NTEU), 513 U.S. 454
(1995).
165. Id. at 457.
166. Id. at 465.
167. [d. at 466-67.
168. [d. at 467.
169. Id. at 468.
170. Id.
171. [d. (quoting Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 571 (1968)).
172. [d. at 468-69.
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This "large-scale disincentive to Government employees' expres
sion also impose[ d] a significant burden on the public's right to read
and hear what the employees would otherwise have written and
said."173 Ultimately, the Court concluded that § 501(b) violated the
First Amendment.1 74 The Court reasoned that:
Because the vast majority of the speech at issue ... [did] not
involve the subject matter of Government employment and
[took] place outside of the workplace, the Government [was] un
able to justify § 501(b) on the grounds of immediate workplace
disruption asserted in Pickering and the cases that followed itP5

Although the government relied on United Public Workers and
Letter Carriers for the proposition that the compensation prohib
ited by § 50l(b) could be proscribed merely because it was "'rea
sonably deemed by Congress to interfere with the efficiency of the
public service,' "176 the Court distinguished the Hatch Act on the
ground that it had "aimed to protect employees' rights, notably
their right to free expression, rather than to restrict those rights."177
In a footnote, the Court stated that the Hatch Act's "employee
protective rationale provided much stronger justification for a pro
scriptive rule than the Government's general interest in workplace
efficiency."178 Notably, this observation was made after Congress
had already repealed the Hatch Act's ban on partisan political ac
tivity with respect to the overwhelming majority of federal employ
ees. 179 In addition, the Court acknowledged that Letter Carriers
had merely "restated in balancing terms" the Court's prior approval
of the Hatch Act in United Public Workers, and that the majority
opinion in Letter Carriers "did not determine how the components
of the Pickering balance should be analyzed in the context of a
sweeping statutory impediment to speech."180
The rationale employed by the Court in NTEU illustrates two
important points. First, despite the reference to Pickering in Letter
Carriers, the Court never actually applied the Pickering balancing
test to the Hatch Act.1 81 Second, NTEU acknowledges that the
!d. at 470.
Id. at 470, 477.
Id. at 470.
176. Id. (quoting United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 101 (1947».
177. Id. at 471.
178. Id. at 475-76 n.21.
179. Hatch Act Reform Amendments of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-94, 107 Stat. 1001.
180. NTEU, 513 U.S. at 467.
181. See id.

173.
174.
175.
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government's burden is greater when it imposes a sweeping statu
tory restriction on expression than it is when the government
merely defends a particular disciplinary decision. 182 Like § 501(b),
the Hatch Act cannot be sustained under Pickering unless the gov
ernment can "show that the interests of both potential audiences
and a vast group of present and future employees" in hearing or
that expressing political messages "are outweighed by that expres
sion's 'necessary impact on the actual operation of the Govern
ment.' "183 This is a much higher standard than the rational basis
standard applied in United Public Workers. The Court's past analy
sis of the Hatch Act under a rational basis standard cannot be rec
onciled with its present-day First Amendment jurisprudence.
Pickering is an imprecise standard, and its exact contours re
main uncertain. The Court recently extended the Pickering balanc
ing test, which had previously been applied only in the context of
speech by public employees and independent contractors, to a situ
ation in which a high school athletic association promulgated a rule
prohibiting high school coaches from recruiting middle school ath
letes. l84 In Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Ass'n v. Brent
wood Academy, the Court explained that "[j]ust as the
government's interest in running an effective workplace can in
some circumstances outweigh employee speech rights, so too can an
athletic league's interest in enforcing its rules sometimes warrant
curtailing the speech of its voluntary participants."185 The Court
determined that the association's interest in preventing "hard-sell
tactics directed at middle school students" outweighed the expres
sive interests of coaches who wanted to engage in prohibited
recruiting practices. 186
While Brentwood Academy emphasized the government's in
terest in suppressing a category of speech directed at a narrow
group of individuals, it is clear that political campaign speech is
closer to the core of the Free Speech Clause than is speech designed
to recruit high school athletes. In various instances, the expressive
activities commonly associated with political campaign speech have
182. Id. at 468.
183. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 571
(1968)).
184. Tenn. Secondary Athletic Ass'n v. Brentwood Acad., 127 S. Ct. 2489, 2492,
2495-98 (2007).
185. /d. at 2495 (citation omitted).
186. Id. at 2495-96.
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been characterized as "highly-protected" speech.1 87 The Court's
failure to engage in a meaningful analysis of the Hatch Act's consti
tutionality in United Public Workers and Letter Carriers was
demeaning to the importance of political association in the United
States. Of course, it is true that a public employee is not always
entitled to Pickering balancing when he or she is disciplined in re
taliation for speech. For instance, in City of San Diego v. Roe, the
Court held that there was no need for Pickering balancing where a
police officer was terminated for making sexually explicit video
tapes of himself in his police uniform. 188 Since the officer's
"speech" did not touch on a matter of public concern, his termina
tion was deemed to be constitutionally permissible without the
need for the Pickering balancing test. 189 Political campaign speech,
however, is the most obvious example of speech addressing a mat
ter of public concern. By applying a rational basis test rather than a
balancing test in United Public Workers and Letter Carriers, the
Court treated political campaign speech as if it were akin to the
sexually explicit videotapes at issue in Roe. The rationale adopted
in NTEU makes it clear that the Hatch Act is unconstitutional
under the Pickering balancing test.1 90 United Public Workers and
Letter Carriers stand in stark contrast to the Court's subsequent de
cisions applying Pickering, and cannot be reaffirmed if the Court is
serious when it says that "[t]he First Amendment limits the ability
of a public employer to leverage the employment relationship to
restrict, incidentally or intentionally, the liberties employees enjoy
in their capacities as private citizens."191
III.

THE HATCH ACT'S PROHIBITION ON
PARTISAN POLITICAL CANDIDACIES

In the wake of the 1993 amendments to the Hatch Act, most
federal employees are now free to actively engage in partisan politi
cal activity.192 Nevertheless, § 7323(a)(3) still prohibits covered
employees from "run[ning] for the nomination or as a candidate for
187. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 416 F.3d 738, 748-49 (8th Cir. 2005),
cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1157 (2006).
188. City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 84 (2004).
189. [d. at 80-85.
190. See United States v. Nat'l Treasury Employees Union (NTEU), 513 U.S.
454,470-77 (1995).
191. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 419 (2006).
192. 5 U.S.c. § 7323(a) (2000).
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election to a partisan political office."193 In NTEU, the Supreme
Court opined that the Hatch Act's "employee-protective rationale"
had provided a "much stronger justification for a proscriptive rule"
than had the government's generalized interest in "workplace effi
ciency."194 While prohibiting federal employees from participating
in another candidate's campaign may at least be rationally related to
a governmental interest in preventing coercion, a prohibition on
candidacy is not even remotely related to this purported interest. It
would certainly be ludicrous for one to contend that a federal em
ployee running for public office might feel pressured or coerced to
participate in his or her own campaign. Despite this reality, federal
employees covered by the Hatch Act risk losing their jobs if they
choose to run for a partisan political office. This is due, in large
part, to the fact that the Hatch Act has been completely divorced
from the original purpose of its enactment.
It is clear that federal employees cannot be disqualified from
eligibility to serve in Congress. The Qualifications Clause of Arti
cle I, Section 2, of the U.S. Constitution provides: "No Person shall
be a Representative who shall not have attained to the Age of
twenty five Years, and been seven Years a Citizen of the United
States, and who shall not, when elected, be an Inhabitant of that
State in which he shall be chosen."195 Similarly, the Qualifications
Clause of Article I, Section 3, provides: "No Person shall be a Sen
ator who shall not have attained to the Age of thirty Years, and
been nine Years a Citizen of the United States, and who shall not,
when elected, be an Inhabitant of that State for which he shall be
chosen."196 The qualifications contained in these two provisions are
exclusive, and Congress has no authority to add to them. 197 In
Powell v. McCormack, the Supreme Court held that Article I, Sec
tion 5 does not give the House of Representatives or the Senate the
"authority to exclude any person, duly elected by his constituents,
who meets all the requirements for membership expressly pre
scribed in the Constitution."198 The Constitution does, of course,
give each house the authority to "punish its Members for disorderly
193.
194.

195.
196.
197.

Id. § 7323(a)(3).
NTEU, 513 u.S. at 475-76 n.21.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2.
Id. art. I, § 3.
See, e.g., U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 783 (1995) (hold

ing that an amendment to the Arkansas State Constitution that imposed term limits on
otherwise eligible congressional candidates to be unconstitutional).
198. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 522 (1969).
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Behavior, and, with the Concurrence of two thirds, [to] expel a
Member."199 Nevertheless, an individual elected to a seat in the
House of Representatives or the Senate cannot be excluded unless
the respective chamber determines that he or she does not meet the
exclusive qualifications enumerated in Article I. Consequently,
Congress has no power to keep a federal employee off of the ballot
in a congressional election.
The Supreme Court elaborated on this principle further in
United States Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton.2° o In United States
Term Limits, the Court invalidated an amendment to the Arkansas
Constitution, which prohibited the name of a congressional candi
date from appearing on the general election ballot if he or she had
already served three terms in the House of Representatives or two
terms in the Senate. 201 The amendment, which was known as
Amendment 73, was found to violate the U.S. Constitution. 202
The Court's analysis in United States Term Limits relied signifi
cantly on Powell. Justice Stevens, who authored the United States
Terms Limits opinion, explained that Powell had established two
important principles of constitutionallaw. 203 The first principle was
that the Framers intended the qualifications enumerated in Article
I to be exclusive. 204 The second principle was "that the people
should choose whom they please to govern them."205 The right of
the people to elect members of the House of Representatives ex
isted from the inception of the Constitution. 206 Members of the
Senate were originally chosen by their respective state legislatures,
but the Seventeenth Amendment provided for the popular election
of Senators. 207 Given the language contained in Article I and the
Seventeenth Amendment, it is the prerogative of the people to
elect any candidate who meets the exclusive qualifications for a seat
in Congress.
The Court found Amendment 73 to be unconstitutional be
cause it prevented candidates who met the qualifications enumer
ated in Article I from appearing on a congressional election
199. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5 ("Each House shall be the Judge of the Elections,
Returns and Qualifications of its own Members.").
200. U.S. Term Limits, 514 U.S. 779.
201. Id. at 783.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 795.
204. Id.
205. Id. (quoting Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 547 (1969».
206. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, amend XVII.
207. Id. art. I, § 3, amend. XVII.
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ballot. 20S The Court rejected the argument that Amendment 73
was a valid exercise of Arkansas's powers under the Elections
Clause. 209 The Elections Clause provides: "The Times, Places and
Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives shall
be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Con
gress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, ex
cept as to the Places of chusing Senators."210 Arkansas argued that
Amendment 73 was a valid exercise of its Elections Clause author
ity, since candidates who could not obtain access to the ballot could
nevertheless run as write-in candidates. 211 The Court rejected this
argument on the ground that the Elections Clause was intended "to
grant States authority to create procedural regulations, not to pro
vide States with license to exclude classes of candidates from fed
eral office."212 Amendment 73 was invalidated as "an indirect
attempt to accomplish what the Constitution prohibit[ed] Arkansas
from accomplishing directly. "213
The Supreme Court discussed this point further in Cook v.
Gralike. 214 Cook involved a challenge to an amendment to article
VIII of the Missouri Constitution that was designed to encourage
members of Missouri's congressional delegation to support a fed
eral constitutional amendment to limit service in Congress to three
terms in the House of Representatives and two terms in the Sen
ate. 2IS The Court explained how article VIII, as amended, pur
ported to achieve its objective:
Three provisions in Article VIII combine to advance its purpose.
Section 17 prescribes that the statement "DISREGARDED
VOTERS' INSTRUCTION ON TERM LIMITS" be printed on
all primary and general [election] ballots adjacent to the name of
a Senator or Representative who fails to take anyone of eight
legislative acts in support of the proposed amendment. Section
18 provides that the statement "DECLINED TO PLEDGE TO
SUPPORT TERM LIMITS" be printed on all primary and gen
eral election ballots next to the name of every nonincumbent
congressional candidate who refuses to take a "Term Limit"
pledge that commits the candidate, if elected, to performing the
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.

u.s. Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 828-38.
Id.
U.S. CONST. art. J, § 4.
U.S. Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 828-38.
Id. at 832-33.
Id. at 829.
Cook v. Gralike, 531 U.S. 510 (2001).
Id. at 514.
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legislative acts enumerated in § 17. And § 19 directs the Mis
souri Secretary of State to determine and declare, pursuant to
§§ 17 and 18, whether either statement should be printed along
side the name of each candidate for Congress. 216

Don Gralike, a nonincumbent congressional candidate, challenged
the constitutionality of article VIII, sections 17 to 19.217 The Mis
souri Secretary of State contended that article VIII, as amended,
was a valid exercise of Missouri's powers under the Elections
Clause and the Tenth Amendment. 218 The Court determined that
neither the Elections Clause nor the Tenth Amendment provided
Missouri with the constitutional authority to enact sections 17 to 19
of article VIIJ.219
Justice Stevens, who wrote the opinion of the Court in u.s.
Term Limits, also delivered the opinion of the Court in Cook. Re
jecting the argument that the amendment to article VIII constituted
an exercise of Tenth Amendment power, he explained that the fed
eral offices at stake arose from the Constitution itself.220 Justice
Stevens declared that "[b]ecause any state authority to regulate
election to those offices could not precede their very creation by
the Constitution, such power 'had to be delegated to, rather than
reserved by, the States."'221 Noting that the Elections Clause "del
egated to the States the power to regulate the 'Times, Places and
Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives,'
subject to a grant of authority to Congress to 'make or alter such
Regulations,''' he stated that "[n]o other constitutional provision
gives the States authority over congressional elections, and no such
authority could be reserved under the Tenth Amendment."222 Con
sequently, "the States may regulate the incidents of such elections,
including balloting, only within the exclusive delegation of power
under the Elections Clause."223 Since the amended version of arti
cle VIII was not a procedural regulation, but rather an attempt" 'to

216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
(1995)).
221.
222.
223.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

514-15 (citations omitted).
at 516.
at 518.
at 522-23.
at 522 (citing U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 805

Id. (quoting U.S. Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 804).
Id. at 522-23 (citations omitted).
Id. at 523.
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favor or disfavor a class of candidates,' "224 it was not deemed to be
a valid exercise of Missouri's Elections Clause authority.225
Powell, U.S. Term Limits, and Cook all stand for the proposi
tion that the right to choose elected representatives in Congress lies
not with Congress or the states, but with the people. Section
7323(a)(3) does not prevent a federal employee from securing a
place on a primary or general election ballot. 226 Instead, it ensures
that a covered employee who exercises his or her right to run for a
partisan political office will face dismissal from federal employ
ment. 227 Since the Hatch Act neither denies federal employees ac
cess to the ballot nor imposes an additional qualification on those
employees who seek election to Congress, it does not violate the
Qualifications Clauses. Nevertheless, it virtually ensures that a cov
ered employee will be terminated in retaliation for becoming a con
gressional candidate. Such termination is based not on workplace
disruptions or adverse effects on the government's operations, but
solely because a federal employee chooses to run for a partisan po
litical office. Moreover, since most federal employees are now free
to participate in partisan political activity under § 7323(a), the "em
ployee-protective rationale" referenced in NTEU can no longer
serve as a "justification for a proscriptive rule. "228 The inevitable
conclusion is that § 7323(a)(3) violates the First Amendment.
The First Amendment protects not only the right to participate
in political campaigns, but also the right to pursue political office as
a candidate. The rights of candidates are inextricably linked with
the rights of voters. 229 The Court's "ballot access cases" under the
First Amendment "have rarely distinguished between the rights of
candidates and the rights of voters. "230 As the Court noted in An
derson v. Celebrezze, "voters can assert their preferences only
through candidates or parties."231 "[L]aws that affect candidates al
ways have at least some theoretical, correlative effect on voters."232
Restrictions designed to prevent candidacies have generally been
224. Id. (quoting U.S. Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 833-34).
225. Id. at 524-25.
226. 5 U.S.c. § 7323(a)(3) (2000).
227. Id. § 7326.
228. United States v. Nat'l Treasury Employees Union (NTEU), 513 U.S. 454,
475-76 n.21 (1995).
229. Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 143 (1972).
230. Cook, 531 U.S. at 531 (Rehnquist, c.J., concurring).
231. Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 787 (1983).
232. Bullock, 405 U.S. at 143.

452

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30:419

found to be unconstitutional.233 The government cannot constitu
tionally manipulate the electoral process in such a way as to defeat
the aspirations of particular candidates or political parties. 234
Even if one's candidacy is viewed outside of the perspective of
a party wishing to support that candidate, First Amendment rights
are individual rights as much as they are collective rights. 235 As the
Court noted in Wooley v. Maynard, "[t]he right to speak and the
right to refrain from speaking are complementary components of
the broader concept of 'individual freedom of mind.' "236 Each in
dividual has the right to seek election to a public office for which he
or she is qualified. The availability of other candidates for parties
and citizens to support is no justification for infringing the First
Amendment rights of a particular person. Since the constitutional
structure presumes that "the people should choose whom they
please to govern them," the voters have the right to hear from all
who wish to govern. 237 Deciding who their leaders should be is the
voters' right, not the government's prerogative. If the Supreme
Court is serious when it says that the Free Speech Clause" 'has its
fullest and most urgent application precisely to the conduct of cam
paigns for political office,'" it cannot continue to adhere to an un
principled line of decisions permitting the government to retaliate
against its own employees precisely because they opt to "'cam
paign[ ] for political office.' "238
The issue is admittedly more complicated where a particular
jurisdiction defines eligibility for a given political office with refer
233. Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279 (1992).
234. Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 25 (1968).
235. The government may enact reasonable regulations to prevent election-re
lated disorder, and "[nlo bright line separates permissible election-related regulation
from unconstitutional infringements on First Amendment freedoms." Timmons v. Twin
Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 359 (1997). Although the Supreme Court noted in
Timmons that a political party's associational rights are not severely burdened merely
because a particular candidate may not appear on the ballot as that party's nominee,
the Court made that observation in the context of a case involving an antifusion statute.
Id. In Timmons, the Court upheld a Minnesota law that prohibited the same "candi
date from appearing on the ballot as the candidate of more than one party." Id. at 354.
The Court reasoned that the law did not prevent other parties from endorsing the nomi
nee of a particular party. [d. at 360. For this reason, the law did not violate the First
and Fourteenth Amendments. Id. at 363. The law prevented no one from seeking pub
lic office, and did not suppress any party's preferences.
236. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977) (emphasis added) (quoting Bd.
of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943)).
237. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486,547 (1969).
238. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 15 (1969) (emphasis added) (quoting Monitor
Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 272 (1971)).
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ence to one's employment status. For instance, in Clements v. Fash
ing, the Supreme Court upheld article III, section 19, of the Texas
Constitution, which provides:
[No] judge of any court, Secretary of State, Attorney General,
clerk of any court of record, or any person holding a lucrative
office under the United States, or this State, or any foreign gov
ernment shall during the term for which he is elected or ap
pointed, be eligible to the Legislature. 239

The Court has observed that it has not always "attached such fun
damental status to candidacy as to invoke a rigorous standard of
review" every time regulatory restrictions place a burden on some
one's ability to run for public office. 240 Nevertheless, there are rec
ognized reasons for not treating the right to be a candidate for
political office as fundamental for all purposes. For instance, most
elective offices must be filled with an occupant who meets a mini
mum age requirement. Such age requirements do not raise serious
constitutional concerns, since the "States may discriminate on the
basis of age without offending the Fourteenth Amendment if the
age classification in question is rationally related to a legitimate
state interest."241 A determination that the right to run for public
office is fundamental in all contexts would require that age qualifi
cations for various political offices be evaluated under the strict
scrutiny standard, which applies to challenges brought under the
Equal Protection Clause for discrimination based on suspect classi
fications or under the Due Process Clause for actions that burden
the exercise of fundamental rights. 242 The reality that the states
have a reasonable degree of latitude to define the qualifications for
their own public offices does not provide a constitutional justifica
tion for the kind of retaliatory termination mandated by
§§ 7323(a)(3) and 7326. Where an individual meets the qualifica
tions for a particular office, governmental action against him or her
for choosing to run for that office violates fundamental constitu
tional principles that are simply not implicated by more generalized
provisions setting forth age qualifications for political officeholders.
Even when federal employees accept public employment, they
remain eligible to serve in Congress if they satisfy the qualifications
enumerated in Article I. Yet, §§ 7323(a)(3) and 7326 provide for
239.
240.
241.
242.

CONST. art. III, § 19; see Clements v. Fashing, 457 U.S. 957, 960 (1982).
Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 142-43 (1972).
Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 83 (2000).
Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Schs., 487 U.S. 450, 457-58 (1988).
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the same kind of dismissal that was found to be unconstitutional in
Pickering, since candidates run for political office in their capacities
as private citizens rather than in their capacities as government em
ployees. While government employees have no constitutional right
to public employment, the First Amendment prohibits the govern
ment from terminating an employee in retaliation for engaging in
expressive activities protected by the First Amendment. In Perry v.
Sindermann, the Court explained:
For at least a quarter-century, this Court has made clear that
even though a person has no "right" to a valuable government
benefit and even though the government may deny him the bene
fit for any number of reasons, there are some reasons upon which
the government may not rely. It may not deny a benefit to a
person on a basis that infringes his constitutionally protected in
terests-especially, his interest in freedom of speech. For if the
government could deny a benefit to a person because of his con
stitutionally protected speech or associations, his exercise of
those freedoms would in effect be penalized and inhibited. 243

The Hatch Act clearly violates this fundamental principle.
The Qualifications Clauses prevent incumbents in Congress
from fencing potential challengers out of the political process di
rectly. However, §§ 7323(a)(3) and 7326 ensure that federal em
ployees who run will be dismissed. This appears to be a
manipUlative attempt to deter a large class of individuals from run
ning for partisan political office. Moreover, it represents hypocrisy
of the worst kind, since members of Congress rarely resign when
they decide to run for a different office. Given that § 7323(a) now
permits most federal employees to participate in partisan political
activity, the government's reliance on an "employee-protective ra
tionale" to justify a "proscriptive rule"244 can no longer withstand
constitutional scrutiny. It is difficult to fathom how an employee
can feel pressured or coerced to participate in his or her own politi
cal campaign. Moreover, since federal employees are free to run
for nonpartisan political offices, § 7323(a)(3) cannot be justified on
the ground that political candidacies by such employees would un
dermine "workplace efficiency."245 Section 7323(a)(3) acts only as
an incumbent-protection provision.
243. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593,597 (1972).
244. United States v. Nat'l Treasury Employees Union (NTEU), 513 U.S. 454,
475-76 n.21 (1995).
245. Id.
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As Justice Scalia recently noted in Rein v. Freedom from Relig
ion Foundation, Inc., the Supreme Court is charged with the duty
"to decide cases by [the] rule of law rather than [by a] show of
hands."246 The constitutionality of restrictions on the expressive ac
tivities of public employees depends on whether such restraints
"are necessary for [government] employers to operate efficiently
and effectively."247 In United Public Workers and Letter Carriers,
the Court never determined that the Hatch Act was necessary for
any purpose, choosing instead to defer to Congress's judgment. 248
Such unqualified deference to Congress is particularly unwarranted
when the very constitutional provision being construed provides
that "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of
speech."249 Section 7323(a)(3) is wholly unrelated to any interest
aside from incumbent protectionism, and it is unconstitutional.
IV.

THE HATCH ACT'S ApPLICATION TO
STATE AND LOCAL EMPLOYEES

The Hatch Act's prohibition on partisan political candidacies
applies to certain state and local government employees as well as
federal employees. The Act defines a
[s]tate or local officer or employee [as] an individual employed
by a State or local agency whose principal employment is in con
nection with an activity which is financed in whole or in part by
loans or grants made by the United States or a Federal agency,
but does not include-an individual who exercises no functions
in connection with that activity[] or an individual employed by
an educational or research institution, establishment, agency, or
system which is supported in whole or in part by a State or politi
cal subdivision thereof, or by a recognized, philanthropic, or cul
tural organization. 25o

The substantive statutory provisions of 5 U.S.c. § 1502(a) provide:
(a) A State or local officer or employee may not
(1) use his official authority or influence for the purpose of
interfering with or affecting the result of an election or a nomina
tion for office;
246. Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2553, 2573 (2007)
(Scalia, J., concurring).
247. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 419 (2006).
248. Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 673 (1994); Rutan v. Republican Party of
Ill., 497 U.S. 62, 98-99 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
249. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
250. 5 U.S.c. § 1501(4) (2000).
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(2) directly or indirectly coerce, attempt to coerce, com
mand, or advise a State or local officer or employee to pay, lend,
or contribute anything of value to a party, committee, organiza
tion, agency, or person for political purposes; or
(3) be a candidate for elective office. 251
Further, 5 U.S.c. § 1502(b) and (c) state that
(b) A State or local officer or employee retains the right to vote
as he chooses and to express his opinions on political subjects
and candidates.
(c) Subsection [1S02](a)(3)['s candidacy prohibition] does not
apply to
(1) the Governor or Lieutenant Governor of a State or an
individual authorized by law to act as Governor;
(2) the mayor of a city;
(3) a duly elected head of an executive department of a State
or municipality who is not classified under a State or municipal
merit or civil-service system; or
(4) an individual holding elective office.252
Moreover,
Section 1502(a)(3) ... does not prohibit any State or local officer
or employee from being a candidate in any election if none of the
candidates is to be nominated or elected at such election as rep
resenting a party any of whose candidates for Presidential elector
received votes in the last preceding election at which Presidential
electors were selected. 253
The statutory enforcement mechanisms are established by
§§ 1504 to 1507. Section 1504 directs federal agencies to report vio
lations of § 1502 to the Special Counsel, who is supposed to "inves
tigate the report and such other information and present his
findings and any charges based on such findings to the Merit Sys
tems Protection Board."254 After a hearing at which the state or
local officer or employee is entitled to be present, the Merit Sys
tems Protection Board is directed to
determine whether a violation of § 1502 . . . has occurred; [to]
determine whether the violation warrants the removal of the of
ficer or employee from his office or employment; and [to] notify
251.
252.
253.
254.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

§
§
§
§

1502(a)(I)-(3).
1502(b), (c)(I)-(4).
1503.
1504.
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the officer or employee and the [employing state or local] agency
of the determination by registered or certified mail. 255

The remedial provisions contained in § 1506 provide for the with
holding of federal funds from a state or local agency which fails to
remove an employee in accordance with a determination made by
the Merit Systems Protection Board. 256 Section 1508 provides for
judicial review of determinations made by the Merit Systems Pro
tection Board in a federal district court.257
Sections 1502(a)(1) and 1502(a)(2) describe the forms of inter
ference and coercion that can undermine the integrity of the electo
ral process. 258 Section 1502(a)(3), however, simply prohibits
covered employees from being candidates in partisan elections.259
The candidacy prohibition bears no rational relationship to any in
terest in preventing interference with the electoral process or
255.
256.

Id. § 1505(1)-(3).
Id. § 1506.

(a) When the Merit Systems Protection Board finds
(1) that a State or local officer or employee has not been removed
from his office or employment within 30 days after notice of a determination
by the Board that he has violated section 1502 of this title [5 U.S.c.] and that
the violation warrants removal; or
(2) that the State or local officer or employee has been removed and
has been appointed within 18 months after his removal to an office or employ
ment in the same State in a State or local agency which does not receive loans
or grants from a Federal agency;
the Board shall make and certify to the appropriate Federal agency an order
requiring that agency to withhold from its loans or grants to the State or local
agency to which notice was given an amount equal to 2 years' pay at the rate
the officer or employee was receiving at the time of the violation. When the
State or local agency to which appointment within 18 months after removal
has been made is one that receives loans or grants from a Federal agency, the
Board order shall direct that the withholding be made from that State or local
agency.
(b) Notice of the order shall be sent by registered or certified mail to the
State or local agency from which the amount is ordered to be withheld. After
the order becomes final, the Federal agency to which the order is certified
shall withhold the amount in accordance with the terms of the order. Except
as provided by section 1508 of this title [5 U.S.c.], a determination or order of
the Board becomes final at the end of 30 days after mailing the notice of the
determination or order.
(c) The Board may not require an amount to be withheld from a loan or
grant pledged by a State or local agency as security for its bonds or notes if the
withholding of that amount would jeopardize the payment of the principal or
interest on the bonds or notes.
Id. § 1506(a)-(c).
257. Id. § 1508.
258. Id. § 1502(a)(1)-(2).
259. Id. § 1502(a)(3).
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shielding government employees from political coercion. Since
§ 1502(a)(3) prohibits covered employees from running for public
office in partisan political elections, it implicates First Amendment
concerns.
Prior to 1974, the Hatch Act prohibited covered state and local
employees "from assuming any active role in political cam
paigns."26o The statute was amended in 1974 to permit state and
local employees to participate in political campaigns, but
§ 1502(a)(3) continued to prohibit covered employees from being
candidates in partisan e1ections,261 "Section 1503 was amended to
specifically allow nonpartisan candidacies," since it had previously
permitted nonpartisan political activities in a more general sense. 262
The Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of the
Hatch Act's application to state and local employees in Oklahoma
v. United States Civil Service Commission, holding that the Act's
application to Oklahoma's employees did not violate the Tenth
Amendment. 263 The Court stated that "[w]hile the United States is
not concerned with, and has no power to regulate, local political
activities as such of state officials, it does have power to fix the
terms upon which its money allotments to states shall be dis
bursed."264 This case was decided on the same day as United Public
Workers.265 Noting its consideration in United Public Workers of
whether the Hatch Act violated the First Amendment, the Court
stated that the facts in Oklahoma did not "require any further dis
cussion of that angle."266
Oklahoma was brought by the state rather than by the state's
employees. Consequently, the First Amendment implications of
the Hatch Act's application to state and local employees were not
squarely at issue. It is unclear whether the Court's reference to its
holding in United Public Workers was meant to foreclose First
Amendment claims against the Hatch Act's application to state and
local employees. In any event, a federal statute prohibiting state
and local government employees from engaging in partisan political
activity implicates constitutional concerns beyond those discussed
in United Public Workers and Letter Carriers.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.

Bauers v. Cornett, 865 F.2d 1517, 1523 (8th Cir. 1989).
Id.
Id.
Oklahoma v. U.S. Civil Servo Comm'n, 330 U.S. 127, 142-45 (1947).
/d. at 143.
/d. at 127; United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 75 (1947).
Oklahoma, 330 U.S. at 142.
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The Supreme Court's post hoc explanations for its decisions in
United Public Workers and Letter Carriers have generally centered
on the principle that "[t]he government's interest in achieving its
goals as effectively and efficiently as possible is elevated from a rel
atively subordinate interest when it acts as sovereign to a significant
one when it acts as employer."267 Nevertheless, this principle can
not be relied upon to save prohibitions like § 1502(a)(3) from con
stitutional infirmity. Congress has no general constitutional
authority to regulate the conduct of state and local government em
ployees.268 When the federal government imposes restrictions on
the political activities of state and local government employees, it
acts as a sovereign rather than as an employer.269 Even if it is as
sumed that a state can restrict the political activities of its own em
ployees without violating the First and Fourteenth Amendments, it
does not follow that Congress can impose similar restrictions on the
state's employees without violating the First Amendment.
Moreover, it is worth noting that Congress cannot use its
Spending Clause authority to entice the states to violate the Four
teenth Amendment.270 Congress "may not 'induce' [a] recipient [of
federal funds] 'to engage in activities that would themselves be un
constitutional.' "271 The First Amendment's prohibitions, of course,
are incorporated within the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment and are applicable against the states. 272 For this rea
son, a determination that a state could not constitutionally impose a
restriction such as § 1502(a)(3) on its own employees would obvi
ously render Congress's attempt to do so unconstitutional. Section
1502(a)(3), however, violates the First Amendment even if the
states could directly impose identical restrictions on their own
employees.
267. Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661,675 (1994).
268. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 929-35 (1997). In Printz, the Court
held that "[t]he Federal Government may neither issue directives requiring the States
to address particular problems, nor command the States' officers, or those of their polit
ical subdivisions, to administer or enforce a federal regulatory program." /d. at 935.
269. Molina-Crespo v. U.S. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 486 F. Supp. 2d 680, 691-92
(N.D. Ohio 2007).
270. As the Supreme Court explained in Saenz v. Roe, "Congress has no affirma
tive power to authorize the states to violate the Fourteenth Amendment and is implic
itly prohibited from passing legislation that purports to validate any such violation."
Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 508 (1999). See generally U.S. CON ST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 1.
271. United States v. Am. Library Ass'n, 539 U.S. 194,203 (2003) (quoting South
Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 210 (1987».
272. Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 508 (1975) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
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In Rust v. Sullivan, the Supreme Court declared that "when the
Government appropriates public funds to establish a program, it is
entitled to define the limits of that program."273 When Congress
exercises its authority under the Spending Clause, it can insist "that
public funds be spent for the purposes for which they were author
ized."274 Nevertheless, conditions placed by Congress on those who
receive federal funds are not categorically immune from First
Amendment scrutiny. The Court noted in Legal Services Corp. v.
Velazquez that "[w]here private speech is involved, even Congress'
antecedent funding decision cannot be aimed at the suppression of
ideas thought inimical to the Government's own interest."275 Since
the federal government does not employ the state and local govern
ment employees covered by § 1502(a)(3), the statutory prohibition
must be analyzed as an exercise of Congress's Spending Clause
authority.276
The Court's statement in Rust that Congress may demand that
public funds be used only as authorized is inapplicable to the Hatch
Act. 277 The partisan candidacy prohibition imposed by § 1502(a)(3)
bears no rational relationship to programs funded by Congress.
The prohibition is not imposed on the recipients of federal funds.
Instead, it is imposed on the employees of recipients. While the
enforcement mechanism established by § 1506 provides for the
withholding of federal funds if a state or local agency refuses to
dismiss an employee who has violated § 1502, the substantive
prohibitions are imposed on the employees in their private capaci
ties. 278 There is no nexus whatsoever between the prohibitions con
tained in § 1502(a)(3) and the federally funded activities. Section
1501(4) simply defines a state employee as "an individual employed
by a State or local agency whose principal employment is in connec
tion with an activity which is financed in whole or in part by loans
or grants made by the United States or a Federal agency," and
§ 1502(a)(3) prohibits such employees from being candidates in
partisan elections. 279 The prohibition itself is not defined with re
spect to any funded program or activity.
273. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 194 (1991).
274. Id. at 196.
275. Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 548-49 (2001).
276. Molina-Crespo v. U.S. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 486 F. Supp. 2d 680, 691-92
(N.D. Ohio 2007).
277. Rust, 500 U.S. at 196.
278. 5 U.S.c. §§ 1502(a)(1)-(3), 1506 (2000).
279. Id. §§ 1501(4), 1502(a)(3).
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Congress often includes within a particular legislative scheme a
jurisdictional element, which operates to limit the prohibition's ap
plication to a discrete category of conduct falling within Congress's
legislative jurisdiction. 280 Section 1501(4) incorporates state or lo
cal agencies' receipt of federal funds as a jurisdictional element to
provide a basis for federal legislative jurisdiction. 281 In this respect,
Congress's use of its Spending Clause authority to impose
§ 1502(a)(3)'s candidacy prohibition on covered state and local gov
ernment employees is indistinguishable from its use of its Com
merce Clause authority in other contexts. 282 In some instances,
Congress uses its powers under both the Spending Clause and the
Commerce Clause to enact substantive statutory provisions.
An example of this use of jurisdictional elements can be found
in the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, which
is codified at 42 U.S.c. § 2000CC. 283 Section 2000cc includes
prohibitions on certain land use regulations, and § 2000cc-1 imposes
limits on the ability of government entities to impose incidental
burdens on the religious freedom of institutionalized persons. 284
Section 2000cc-1(b)(1) uses the covered governmental entities' re
ceipt of federal funds as a means to establish federal legislative ju
risdiction, while § 2000cc-1(b)(2) uses Congress's powers under the
Foreign, Interstate, and Indian Commerce Clauses for the same
purpose,285 Without such jurisdictional elements, Congress would
280. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 611-12 (2000).
281. 5 U.S.c. § 1501(4).
282. 42 U.S.c. § 2000cc-1(b)(1)-(2) (2000).
283. Id. § 2000cc-5.
284. Id. §§ 2000cc to cc-1. Section 2000cc-1 provides:
(a) General rule.
No government shall impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a
person residing in or confined to an institution, as defined in [section 2 of the
Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act 42 U.S.c. § 1997], even if the
burden results from a rule of general applicability, unless the government
demonstrates that imposition of the burden on that person
(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and
(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling govern
mental interest.
(b) Scope of application.
This section applies in any case in which
(1) the substantial burden is imposed in a program or activity that re
ceives Federal financial assistance; or
(2) the substantial burden affects, or removal of that substantial burden
would affect, commerce with foreign nations, among the several States, or with
Indian tribes.
Id. § 2000cc-1.
285. Id. § 2000cc-1(b)(1)-(2).
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have no constitutional authority to enact the substantive prohibi
tions contained within § 2000cc-1(a).286 This same principle applies
to the jurisdictional element incorporated within § 1502(a)(3) by
the definition contained in § 1501(4).
The mere existence of a jurisdictional element premised on the
Spending Clause, however, does not insulate a statute from First
Amendment scrutiny. Instead, it simply provides a jurisdictional
basis for federal legislation. The First Amendment imposes sub
stantive limits on Congress's Spending Clause authority.287 Since
§ 1502(a)(3) limits the private activities of funding recipients' em
ployees rather than the activities of the funding recipients them
selves, any perceived link between the federal funds and the
prohibited activities is very attenuated. Because § 1502(a)(3)'s par
tisan candidacy proscription, at a minimum, implicates the First
Amendment rights of covered employees, it cannot be sustained on
such an attenuated basis.
If Congress could constitutionally impose § 1502(a)(3) on cov
ered state and local government employees merely because their
employers are recipients of federal funds, there is no logical reason
why Congress could not also impose a similar prohibition on state
and local government employees whose employers have some effect
on interstate commerce. If a jurisdictional element is enough to jus
tify the proscription, it is difficult to imagine why the particular con
stitutional power invoked by Congress would make a dispositive
difference. Moreover, if the employees of state and local agencies
could be prohibited from running for partisan political office simply
because their employers receive federal money, there is no reason
why Congress could not also impose a similar restriction on the em
ployees of private entities that receive federal money. For instance,
Congress could apply § 1502(a)(3)'s prohibition to the employees
of private colleges and universities that receive federal funds. Since
§ 1502(a)(3) is not linked to an employment relationship between
the federal government and covered state and local government
employees, the federal government is acting as a sovereign rather
than as an employer.288 If the First Amendment permitted the fed
eral government to use its sovereign powers to prohibit partisan po
litical candidacies, there would be no logical basis for distinguishing
286. See Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 714, 715 (2005).
287. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 102-04 (1968).
288. Molina-Crespo v. U.S. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 486 F. Supp. 2d 680, 691-92
(N.D. Ohio 2007).
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between the employees of state and local governments that receive
federal funds and the employees of private entities that also receive
such funds. The logical conclusion, of course, is that Congress can
not use its sovereign powers to prohibit partisan political candida
cies, and that § 1502(a)(3) is unconstitutional.
The Supreme Court has not clearly explained when a funding
condition imposed on a private entity ceases to be permissible and
becomes unconstitutional. In Grove City College v. Bell, the Court
declared that "Congress is free to attach reasonable and unambigu
ous conditions to federal financial assistance that educational insti
tutions are not obligated to accept. "289 Voluntariness alone,
however, does not insulate a funding condition from constitutional
scrutiny. As the Court explained in Rumsfeld v. Forum for Aca
demic and Institutional Rights, Inc., while it is unclear where the
line between "reasonable" conditions and unconstitutional condi
tions lies, "[i]t is clear that a funding condition cannot be unconsti
tutional if it could be constitutionally imposed directly."290 It is safe
to say that the federal government, acting in its sovereign capacity,
could not constitutionally prohibit classes of individuals from run
ning for partisan political office.
If § 1502's prohibitions applied directly to state and local agen
cies, they would arguably be immune from First Amendment scru
tiny on the ground that governmental entities do not have First
Amendment rights. 291 Nevertheless, employees of governmental
entities do have First Amendment rights. Since § 1502(a)(3) im
poses a partisan candidacy prohibition on covered state and local
government employees in their private capacities, the First Amend
ment is clearly implicated. Moreover, since covered employees
have no control over whether their employers receive federal funds,
they are not in a position to reject such funds in order to protect
their constitutional rights. Spending Clause legislation "is much in
the nature of a contract," and conditions on the receipt of federal
funds must be accepted "voluntarily and knowingly."292 Such legis
lation must be construed from the perspective of a recipient en
gaged in the process of deciding whether to accept federal funds

289.
290.
(2006).
291.
292.

Grove City Coli. v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555,575 (1984).
Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Inst. Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 59-60
United States v. Am. Library Ass'n, 539 U.S. 194,210-11 (2003).
Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 2 (1981).
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and "the obligations that go with those funds."293 It is difficult to
fathom how this rule of construction should be applied when the
obligations attached to federal funds are imposed on the employees
of recipients rather than on the recipients themselves.
Given the reality that a Spending Clause nexus such as that
contained in §§ 1501(4) and 1502(a)(3) could not justify the imposi
tion of a partisan candidacy proscription on the employees of pri
vate institutions, it is axiomatic that § 1502(a)(3) violates the First
Amendment. In Molina-Crespo v. United States Merit Systems Pro
tection Board, however, the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of Ohio found an innovative way to uphold it. 294 The inter
ests identified by the district court as a justification for upholding
§ 1502(a)(3) included the federal government's interests in ensuring
both "that state programs funded . . . with federal dollars [were]
administered in a non-partisan manner" and that members of the
public were not left with the impression "that those involved in ad
ministering [funded] programs" were "partisan politicians exerting
inappropriate partisan influence."295 Based on these interests, the
district court determined that § 1502(a)(3) passed the rational basis
test. 296
In an alternative analysis, the district court explained why it
believed that § 1502(a)(3) also satisfied the demands of strict
scrutiny:
[T]he Court finds that under strict scrutiny review, the prohibi
tion against running for partisan elected office is narrowly tai
lored to the perceived harm. Covered state and local employees
remain free to engage in a wide range of political activities. In
deed, when Congress amended the Act in 1974 to loosen the con
straints on political activity for state or local employees, only
three narrowly focused restraints remained, one of which is the
§ 1S02(a)(3) ban on being a candidate for elective office. There
fore, the restriction in § 1S02(a)(3), of which Molina-Crespo had
full knowledge before he chose to run for elective office, is nar
rowly tailored, and thus does not unduly burden the First
Amendment rights of state and local employees. 297
293.
(2006).
294.
2007).
295.
296.
297.

Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 126 S. Ct. 2455, 2459
Molina-Crespo v. U.S. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 486 F. Supp. 2d 680 (N.D. Ohio
Id. at 691.
Id.
Id. at 693 (citations omitted).
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Given the meaningless review provided by the Supreme Court in
United Public Workers, Letter Carriers, and Oklahoma, it is very
easy to see why the district court had no idea as to what standard
was applicable in Molina-Crespo. Nevertheless, the district court's
analysis clearly failed to comport with fundamental principles of
constitutional law. The applicable test for evaluating the constitu
tionality of § 1502(a)(3) under the First Amendment cannot be ra
tional basis, which is far more deferential than the balancing test
established in Pickering. Since the federal government acts as a
sovereign rather than as an employer with respect to
§ 1502(a)(3),298 there is no basis whatsoever for applying a standard
that is less rigorous than the Pickering balancing test.
When the district court applied the strict scrutiny analysis, it
applied it incorrectly. Where strict scrutiny is the test, the govern
ment must show that the challenged enactment is narrowly tailored
to secure a compelling governmental interest. 299 It is not sufficient
for the government to show that the challenged enactment is nar
rowly tailored to address a perceived harm. Far from a principled
application of the Constitution, the district court's decision in
Molina-Crespo is only the latest in the federal judiciary's long line
of pro-Hatch Act novelties.
It is clear that the prohibitions contained in §§ 1502(a)(1) and
1502(a)(2) are constitutionally permissible. No one has a First
Amendment right to interfere with or affect the result of an elec
tion by using official authority, or to coerce someone else to make a
political contribution. 30o The federal government may use its sover
eign authority under the Spending Clause to prohibit covered state
and local government employees from engaging in such corrupt ac
tivities. Section 1502(a)(3), however, raises wholly different consti
tutional concerns. If the First Amendment provides even minimal
protection to an individual's right to run for a partisan political of
fice, § 1502(a)(3) cannot stand. The prohibition is wholly unrelated
to the federal funds involved, since it restricts the employees of re
cipients rather than the recipients themselves. 301 There is no nexus
between the partisan candidacy proscription and any funded pro
gram, since the proscription is not defined with respect to any par
ticular program or activity.302 The object of the legislation is the
!d. at 691-92.
299. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 774-75 (2002).
300. 5 U.S.c. § 1502(a)(1)-(2) (2000).
301. Jd. §§ 1501(4), 1502(a)(3).
302. Jd.

298.
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abridgment of speech, not the allocation of federal money. Section
1502(a)(3) is not an attempt to control federal spending. Instead,
Congress invoked federal spending as a jurisdictional basis for en
acting § 1502(a)(3). Federal funding is identified in § 1501(4) solely
to enable incumbents in Congress to prohibit a broad class of indi
viduals from doing what those same incumbents did to secure their
positions. 303
In Molina-Crespo, the district court was right about one thing:
Section 1502(a)(3) is narrowly tailored. 304 It is tailored so narrowly
that it prohibits only the very thing that can unseat an incumbent in
Congress. Under § 1503, covered employees can run for political
office in nonpartisan elections. 305 In their private capacities, they
remain free to engage in a wide variety of political activities. As
long as they refrain from running for partisan political office, they
will not be harassed by the Merit Systems Protection Board. How
ever, if they dare to challenge a partisan incumbent, retaliatory ac
tions of the kind condemned in Elrod, Branti, Rutan, Umbehr, and
O'Hare will be undertaken by the federal government in the name
of the law. 306 Section 1502(a)(3) is the quintessential example of a
constitutionally suspect statutory provision. It is both too narrow
and too broad. 307 It narrowly prohibits only the very thing that
threatens the ambitions of its drafters, and it broadly casts its net
around all state and local government employees within § 1501(4)'s
jurisdictional element. 308 It leaves political speech untouched only
if it has no meaningful purpose, and it muzzles speech with electoral
significance. If § 1502(a)(3) can withstand constitutional scrutiny,
the First Amendment is an empty promise.
V.

THE IMPORTANCE OF POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

The provisions of the Hatch Act governing both federal and
state employees make it clear that covered employees retain their
right to vote. 309 Many employees covered by the provisions of the
Hatch Act, particularly those covered by § 7323(b), may consider
their right to vote to be more important than any right to partici
303. Id. § 1501(4).
304. Molina-Crespo v. U.S. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 486 F. Supp. 2d 680, 693 (N.D.
Ohio 2007).
305. 5 U.S.c. § 1503.
306. Id. §§ 1504-1506.
307. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633 (1996).
308. 5 U.S.c. § 1501(4).
309. Id. §§ 1502(b), 7323(c).
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pate in partisan political activity. While the electoral franchise is
certainly important, the right to engage in political activity is, in
many respects, even more fundamental than the right to cast a vote.
When the Constitution was first adopted, only members of the
House of Representatives were chosen by popular vote. 310 U.S.
senators were chosen by their respective state legislatures. 311 Sena
tors were not elected by popular vote until the enactment of the
Seventeenth Amendment in 1913.312 Consequently, when the First
Amendment was adopted in 1791, the idea of holding popular elec
tions for U.S. senators was wholly foreign to the Constitution. Nev
ertheless, the people had the right to engage in expressive activities
for the purpose of influencing their state legislators, who were re
sponsible for choosing U.S. senators.
Americans are accustomed to voting in presidential elections,
but popular elections for presidential electors are certainly not re
quired by the Constitution. Under Article II, Section 1, it is the
responsibility of each state to "appoint, in such Manner as the Leg
islature thereof may direct, a Number of Electors, equal to the
whole Number of Senators and Representatives to which the State
may be entitled in the Congress."313 Pursuant to the Twenty-third
Amendment, the District of Columbia is entitled to appoint,
in such manner as the Congress may direct: A number of electors
of President and Vice President equal to the whole number of
Senators and Representatives in Congress to which the District
would be entitled if it were a State, but in no event more than the
least populous State. 314

The electors appointed by the states and the District of Columbia
elect the President and the Vice President in accordance with the
procedures established by the Twelfth Amendment. 315
Although Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment316 and Sec
tion 1 of the Twenty-fourth Amendment317 acknowledge the exis
tence of popular elections for the purpose of appointing
presidential electors, these provisions do not require any state, or
the District of Columbia, to hold popular elections for that pur
310.
311.
312.
313.
314.
315.
316.
317.

u.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. l.
Id. art. I, § 3.
Id. amend. XVII.
Id. art. II, § 1.
Id. amend. XXIII.
Id. amend. XII.
Id. amend. XIV, § 2.
Id. amend. XXIV, § 1.
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pose. 318 As the Supreme Court explained in Bush v. Gore, "The
individual citizen has no federal constitutional right to vote for elec
tors for the President of the United States unless and until the state
legislature chooses a statewide election as the means to implement
its power to appoint members of the electoral college. "319 A state
"may, if it so chooses, select the electors itself, which indeed was
the manner used by state legislatures in several states for many
years after the framing of our Constitution."32o Having granted the
franchise to the people, a state remains free to "take back the
power to appoint electors" pursuant to Article II, Section 1.321 Ac
cordingly, Americans cast their votes in presidential elections not as
a matter of constitutional right, but as a matter of legislative grace.
The right to cast such a vote is wholly dependent on the continuing
assent of the respective state legislature.
The freedom to speak for or against a particular presidential
candidate, however, is not dependent on the consent of any govern
mental entity. Congress may, if it so chooses, use its authority
under the Twenty-third Amendment to deprive the residents of the
District of Columbia of their statutory right to vote for presidential
electors. Nonetheless, Congress may not deprive those residents, or
the residents of the several states, of their freedom of speech.
The Free Speech Clause, of course, is incorporated within the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 322 Conse
quently, the states "shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of
speech."323 While the states remain free, under Article II, Section
1, to deprive their citizens of their statutory right to vote for presi
dential electors, the First and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit
them from banning expressive activities designed to influence presi
dential elections. A plain reading of the Constitution reveals that,
even more than the electoral franchise itself, "unabridged speech is
the foundation of political freedom."324 As Justice Black noted in
his United Public Workers dissent, "The right to vote and privately
to express an opinion on political matters, important though they
318. Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 70, 76 (2000) (per
_ curiam) (citing McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 25 (1892)).
319. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 104 (2000) (per curiam).
320. [d.
321. [d.
322. See Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 508 (1974) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
323. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
324. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765,794 (2002) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
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be, are but parts of the broad freedoms which our Constitution has
provided as the bulwark of our free political institutions. "325
Notwithstanding the Framers' initial idea that state legislatures
should choose their respective U.S. senators, the Seventeenth
Amendment has now given that right to the people directly.326 De
spite the constitutional prerogative of the states to dispense with
popular elections for presidential electors, "[h]istory has now fa
vored the voter, and in each of the several States the citizens them
selves vote for Presidential electors."327 As popular elections have
become a central feature of the American political system, the im
portance of political campaigns has steadily increased over time.
With popular elections for members of the Senate and the Electoral
College, as well as for members of the House of Representatives, it
is more important than ever that "the voice of none should be
suppressed."328
In order to understand the importance of the constitutional
values undermined by the Hatch Act, one need look no further
than the Hatch Act itself. Section 7325 provides:
The Office of Personnel Management may prescribe regulations
permitting employees, without regard to the prohibitions in
paragraphs (2) and (3) of section 7323(a) and paragraph (2) of
section 7323(b) of this title [5 U.S.c.], to take an active part in
political management and political campaigns involving the mu
nicipality or other political subdivision in which they reside, to
the extent the Office considers it to be in their domestic interest,
when
(1) the municipality or political subdivision is in Maryland
or Virginia and in the immediate vicinity of the District of Co
lumbia, or is a municipality in which the majority of voters are
employed by the Government of the United States; and
(2) the Office determines that because of special or unusual
circumstances which exist in the municipality or political subdivi
sion it is in the domestic interest of the employees and individu
als to permit that political participation. 329

This statutory language acknowledges that a democratic society
cannot function without the political participation of its inhabitants.
325. United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 110 (1947) (Black, J.,
dissenting).
326. U.S. CONST. amend. XVII.
327. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 104 (2000) (per curiam).
328. United Pub. Workers, 330 U.S. at 114 (Black, J., dissenting).
329. 5 U.S.C. § 7325 (2000).
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In this respect, the Hatch Act impugns itself. If insufficient num
bers of people participate in the political process, democracies de
cay, republics collapse, and free societies falter.
Even in jurisdictions in which participants are legion, the politi
cal process suffers when the voices of a few are silenced. In the
words of Justice Black, "Our political system, different from many
others, rests on the foundation of a belief in rule by the people
not some, but all the people."330 The protections of the First
Amendment do not contain exceptions providing for the muzzling
of those employees covered by § 7323(b). Congress's attempt to
silence these devoted citizens is constitutionally impermissible.
Federal, state, and local government employees who answer
the call to public service deserve better than to be badgered by the
Merit Systems Protection Board. Sections lS02(a)(3) and
7323(a)(3), which serve no interests aside from incumbent protec
tionism, cannot withstand constitutional scrutiny if the First
Amendment is to have its intended effect. The federal judiciary's
complicity in Congress's attempts to deter potential candidates
from taking on partisan incumbents is antithetical to the principle
of the principle that the government "cannot condition public em
ployment on a basis that infringes the employee's constitutionally
protected interest in freedom of expression. "331 The application of
constitutional principles compels the conclusion that the provisions
of the Hatch Act restricting the private political activities of govern
ment employees cannot stand.
CONCLUSION

For too long, the provisions of the Hatch Act restricting the
private political activities of government employees have had un
qualified acceptance. The reality of the matter, however, is that
these provisions patently violate the First Amendment rights of
covered employees without serving any clear governmental interest.
Partisan political candidates and campaign volunteers do not per
form governmental functions when they participate in the electoral
process. They are merely citizens seeking to choose leaders from
among themselves. To say that one's employment status is incom
patible with partisan political participation is to say that his or her
employment status is incompatible with being American.
330.
331.

United Pub. Workers, 330 U.S. at 114 (Black, J., dissenting).
Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 142 (1983).
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Congress's decision in 1993 to permit most federal executive
employees to participate in partisan political activity is perhaps the
strongest indicator to date that the more stringent prohibitions of
the Hatch Act were never really necessary to prevent political ex
tortion or coercion. Since the federal employees covered by
§ 7323(b) remain under such prohibitions, however, it is worth not
ing that political extortion is not only proscribed by §§ 7323(a)(1),
7323(a)(2), and 7323(a)(4), but by several criminal statutes as welL
It is a federal crime
for any person to intimidate, threaten, command, or coerce, or
attempt to intimidate, threaten, command, or coerce, any em
ployee of the Federal Government ... to engage in, or not to
engage in, any political activity, including, but not limited to, vot
ing or refusing to vote for any candidate or measure in any elec
tion, making or refusing to make any political contribution, or
working or refusing to work on behalf of any candidate. 332
It is also a crime for covered employees to use their official author

ity for the purpose of interfering with an election. 333 Prohibiting
government employees from voluntarily participating in partisan
political activity for the purpose of preventing coercion is akin to
banning sexual intercourse for the purpose of preventing rape. The
First Amendment rights of government employees cannot be pro
tected by a prohibition which prevents them from exercising those
rights in the first place. The Hatch Act's "employee-protective ra
tionale" literally "turns the First Amendment upside down."334
Freedom of thought cannot be secured by the suppression of
speech. As the Supreme Court explained in Ashcroft v. Free Speech
Coalition, "[t]he right to think is the beginning of freedom, and
speech must be protected from the government because speech is
the beginning of thought. "335
The government's interest in maintaining a merit-based em
ployment system can be adequately secured without the need to
infringe upon the First Amendment rights of government employ
ees. Candidates are prohibited from procuring support for their
candidacies by promising to use their influence to secure the ap
pointment of their political allies. 336 It is also illegal to promise a
332. 18 u.s.c. § 610 (2000).
333. [d. § 595.
334. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 255 (2002).
335. [d. at 253.
336. 18 U.S.c. § 599.
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benefit to another in exchange for political favors or electoral sup
port. 337 Criminal activity is properly addressed by measures that
punish offenders, not by measures that silence potential victims.
It is, of course, true that political affiliation may be used by the
government as a basis for making personnel decisions in certain in
stances. As the Supreme Court recognized in Branti, party affilia
tion is sometimes "an appropriate requirement for the effective
performance of the public office involved."338 Such circumstances,
however, are not foreign to federal employment law, and the legal
framework for adjudicating such cases is firmly established. Al
though Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 generally prohibits
covered employers from discriminating on the basis of race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin, an employer may nevertheless
make personnel decisions on the basis of religion, sex, or national
origin "in those certain instances where religion, sex, or national
origin is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary
to the normal operation of that particular business or enter
prise."339 A similar provision is contained in the Age Discrimina
tion in Employment AcP40 Where the particular position at issue
is such that political affiliation is a bona fide occupational qualifica
tion, hiring and firing decisions can constitutionally be made on the
basis of political affiliation. This reality does not necessitate the
suppression of the political speech of large classes of government
employees, many of whom perform ministerial functions which do
not implicate partisan concerns.
The Hatch Act's prohibitions on partisan political candidacies
are likewise unsupported by any palpable governmental interesp41
The Constitution certainly recognizes that federal employment may
be incompatible with concurrent service in Congress. The relevant
portion of Article I, Section 6, provides:
No Senator or Representative shall, during the Time for
which he was elected, be appointed to any civil Office under the
Authority of the United States, which shall have been created, or
the Emoluments whereof shall have been encreased during such
time; and no Person holding any Office under the United States,
337.
338.
339.
340.
341.

Id. § 600.
Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 518 (1980).
42 U.S.c. § 2000e-2(e)(1) (2000).
29 U.S.c. § 623(f)(1) (2000).
See generally 5 U.s.c. §§ 1502(a)(3), 7323(a)(3) (2000).
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shall be a Member of either House during his Continuance in
Office. 342
The constitutional prohibition on concurrent congressional service
and federal employment, however, has nothing to do with concur
rent congressional candidacy and federal employment. Since politi
cal candidates run for office in their private capacities, there is no
possibility of an employment-related conflict of interest until one
actually holds a political office. Moreover, since it is the voters who
ultimately determine the results of elections, no government em
ployee could assume such an office without the consent of "We the
People." Sections 1502(a)(3) and 7323(a)(3) do not protect our de
mocracy. Instead, they subvert it.
While the Hatch Act is perhaps the most notable employment
based prohibition on partisan political activity, it is by no means the
only one. The Supreme Court decided Broadrick v. Oklahoma 343
on the same day that it decided Letter Carriers. In Broadrick, the
Court rejected the argument that an Oklahoma statute prohibiting
certain state employees from engaging in partisan political activity
was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. 344 The Oklahoma
statute was similar to the Hatch Act in many respects,345 but it pur
ported to impose criminal sanctions on those who violated its provi
sions in addition to termination from government employment. 346
Since the employees in Broadrick did not question "Oklahoma's
right to place even-handed restrictions on the partisan political con
duct of state employees," the validity of criminal sanctions for those
who violated the statutory prohibition on political activity was
never before the Court. 347 Nevertheless, even if one is inclined to
accept the erroneous assumption that a governmental entity may
constitutionally condition public employment on an employee's
willingness to refrain from political activity, it does not follow that
the government may impose criminal sanctions on an employee
who engages in political activity. When the government merely ter
minates an employee, it acts as an employer. When the government
prosecutes an employee for engaging in political activity, it acts in
its sovereign capacity. The First and Fourteenth Amendments
clearly prohibit Congress and the states from using their sovereign
342.
343.
344.
345.
346.
347.

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 2.
Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973).
Id. at 607-08.
Id. at 604.
Id. at 606.
Id.
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authority to criminalize partisan political activity, and any attempt
to impose punishment on an employee beyond mere termination is
blatantly unconstitutional,348 It is true that the Supreme Court
stated in Ex parte Curtis that "[i]f it is constitutional to prohibit the
act, the kind or degree of punishment to be inflicted for disregard
ing the prohibition is clearly within the discretion of Congress, pro
vided it be not cruel or unusual."349 The statute at issue in that
case, however, did not prohibit covered employees from engaging
in political activity. Instead, it only prohibited federal executive
employees "from requesting, giving to, or receiving from, any other
officer or employ[ ee] of the government, any money or property or
other thing of value for political purposes."350 There is no constitu
tional basis for imposing criminal sanctions, or any other form of
punishment beyond mere termination, on a government employee
who engages in political activity. Attempts to criminalize political
activity on the part of government employees are impermissible.
Justice Douglas filed a dissenting opinion in Broadrick, decry
ing the majority's willingness to allow the government to deprive its
employees of their right to participate in partisan political activ
ity.351 He declared that "once we fence off a group, and bar them
from public dialogue, the public interest is the loser. "352 He went
on to state:
A bureaucracy that is alert, vigilant, and alive is more effi
cient than one that is quiet and submissive. It is the First
Amendment that makes it alert, vigilant, and alive. It is suppres
sion of First Amendment rights that creates faceless, nameless
bureaucrats who are inert in their localities and submissive to
some master's voice. High values ride on today's decision in this
case and in Letter Carriers. I would not allow the bureaucracy in
the State or Federal Government to be deprived of First Amend
ment rights. Their exercise certainly is as important in the public
sector as it is in the private sector. Those who work for govern
ment have no watered-down constitutional rights. So far as the
348. In Connick v. Myers, the Supreme Court explained that "an employee's false
criticism of his employer on grounds not of public concern may be cause for his dis
charge but would be entitled to the same protection in a libel action accorded an identi
cal statement made by a man on the street." Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147
(1983).
349. Ex parte Curtis, 106 U.S. 371, 374 (1882).
350. Id. at 371.
351. Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 618-21 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
352. Id. at 620.
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First Amendment goes, I would keep them on the same plane as
all other people. 353
Justice Douglas was right in 1973, and he is right today.
In United Public Workers, the Supreme Court acknowledged
that Congress could not constitutionally prohibit federal employees
from attending Mass or taking an active part in missionary work. 354
Given this limitation on Congress's authority, it is difficult to
fathom how the Court determined that the Hatch Act was constitu
tional, since political speech is "as deeply embedded in the First
Amendment as proselytizing a religious cause. "355 The idea that
government employees should expect unique burdens on their po
litical freedom is patently absurd. Since the First Amendment im
poses no limits on the actions of purely private entities, government
employers are the only employers that cannot constitutionally ter
minate their employees in retaliation for political speech. As Jus
tice Stevens noted in his Waters dissent, "[a]bsent some contractual
or statutory provision limiting its prerogatives, a private-sector em
ployer may discipline or fire employees for speaking their
minds."356 Government employees, however, have a First Amend
ment right to speak their minds, and to be free from retaliatory
termination for doing SO.357
The fact that so many government employees blindly acquiesce
to unconstitutional restrictions on their political activities is the
strongest evidence to date that the government has succeeded in
creating "faceless, nameless bureaucrats who are inert in their local
ities and submissive to some master's voice. "358 It is incumbent
upon all government employees to wake up, to speak out, and to
demand an end to this subtle form of tyranny. Prohibitions on po
litical activity are the hallmarks of tyrannical regimes and wicked
rulers. They need not be the hallmarks of government employers in
the United States. In recent years, the world has witnessed the
courage of the brave citizens of Iraq and Afghanistan, who partici
pated in historic elections despite the fact that terrorists were trying
to kill them in retaliation for doing so. They understood that their
young democracies would falter without their participation. Sec
353.
354.
355.
(Douglas,
356.
357.
358.

Id. at 62l.
United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 100 (1947).
U.S. Civil Servo Comm'n v. Nat'l Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 598
J., dissenting).
Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 694-95 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 695.
Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 621 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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tions 1502(a)(3), 7323(a)(3), and 7323(b) of the Hatch Act cannot
stand if American democracy is to continue to flourish. Our de
mocracy is fragile, and our Constitution is not a self-executing
formula. As Americans, we cannot afford to let any institution
erode the bulwarks of freedom enshrined in our Constitution-not
even our own government.

